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Preface
The effectiveness of education, the role of parents in shaping the 
characters of their children, the causes of violence and crime, and the 
roots of personal unhappiness are matters that are central to humanity. 
Like so many other fundamental issues about human existence, they 
all relate to behavioural development. The catalogue continues. Do bad 
experiences in early life have a lasting effect? Is intelligence inherited? 
Can adults change their attitudes and behaviour? When faced with such 
questions, many people want simple answers. They want to know what 
really makes the difference.
Development presents many wonders, but one of the most 
remarkable is how a fully functional individual grows from a 
microscopic embryo. The processes that are involved have often seemed 
beyond understanding and, even now, much remains to be discovered. 
Nevertheless, the factual certainties of stability and change have been 
known for a long time. The robust constancies of development are 
profound and real. Nobody will confuse a human with a rhesus monkey. 
At the same time, the plasticity of each individual is as remarkable as his 
or her robustness. Humans possess great capacity for change, a capacity 
that, as in other species, emerges very early in development. It does 
not follow, though, that two distinct processes can be cleanly separated, 
one leading to invariant outcomes and the other generating differences 
between individuals due to culture, education and experience. If such 
separation were possible, it might be sensible to ask the question how 
much of a behaviour pattern is innate and how much is learned or, more 
generally, how much is genetic and how much is due to the environment. 
This dichotomy, which was popular in the early days of my own subject 
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of ethology, is neither valid nor helpful but unfortunately it persists in 
popular accounts of where behaviour comes from and in some scientific 
literature. I suspect that some of the persistence is due to a hangover 
from folk psychology and folk biology. I also suspect that some cultural 
lag has occurred partly because dichotomies are easy to remember and 
understand.
In ethology, many of us were bird watchers before we started our 
careers as scientists and were accustomed to the free-flowing run of 
behaviour of animals. Although we wouldn’t have thought of it in these 
terms, we were accustomed to what we now see as systems.1 The actions 
of one moment become the triggers of the next and feed back so that 
behaviour brings to an end its own performance. Other scientists have 
been trained analytically and assume that any research programmes 
should hunt down the crucial factor that produced a qualitatively 
distinct effect. The talk of systems may sound to them like so much 
waffle. Their mantra is that science is about uncovering causes. 
Changing minds is always difficult, but it is possible to be optimistic 
that systems approaches will become widespread. Indeed, in recent 
years the mood has started to change. Experimentalists are less likely 
these days to hold all but one variable constant and, when a single 
independent variable is found to produce an effect, it is not immediately 
taken to be the cause, nor is everything else deemed unimportant. 
The nature of the feedback in free-running systems is such that the 
experimentalist’s distinction between independence and dependence 
evaporates. The dependent variable of a moment ago becomes the 
independent variable of the present.
Maybe these changes in thinking have come about because computer 
literacy has made it possible to think about the interplay between many 
different things with comparative ease. It is not difficult to construct 
simple working models on our personal computers. When the rules 
of operation are non-linear, the behaviour of these models, when 
the parameters are altered, can change in complicated ways that are 
difficult to predict. Without basing them rigorously on what is known 
about behaviour and underlying mechanisms, such models merely 
serve to teach us a simple lesson about causality. But the more general 
1  See Oyama, S., Griffiths, P.E. & Gray, R.D. (eds.) (2001), Cycles of Contingency: 
Developmental Systems and Evolution. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
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point is that the development of individuals is readily perceived as an 
interplay between them and their environments. The current state of the 
individual influences which genes are expressed, and also impacts on 
the social and physical world. Individuals are then seen as choosing and 
changing the conditions to which they are exposed.
A central theme in biology has been the ways in which the various 
features of an organism all fit together to create a well adapted whole. 
Charles Darwin’s great theory of natural selection provided a cogent 
way of thinking about how such adaptations evolved. Organisms are 
highly adaptable and their abilities to meet environmental challenges 
are also represented in the fit between their characteristics and their 
ecology. The appearance of design strikes us again and again and is the 
basis for the first chapter, but the theme runs throughout the essays in 
this book. 
My own research interest, starting as a graduate student, has been in 
the development of behaviour, with a particular focus on the remarkable 
process of imprinting in birds. Part of this was a long-standing 
collaboration with Gabriel Horn on the neural basis of imprinting2 but 
my work also had a strong whole-animal dimension to it. I was trained 
as a zoologist and frequently ask questions about the biological function 
and evolution of behaviour. In the second chapter I describe imprinting 
as a system well adapted by evolution to its current use and central to 
the attachment of offspring to one or both of their parents.
Chapter 3 deals with the rules that underlie the development of the 
individual and the reciprocity between those rules and the individual’s 
experience. I was much influenced by the writings of C.H. Waddington3 
whose systems approach was not fashionable in the last decades of the 
twentieth century but now becomes increasingly important in making 
sense of the complexity of development.4
The young organism has to deal with the challenges that meet it as 
it develops. Its ecology may be very different from that of the adult, in 
which case it may have special adaptations to deal with those conditions. 
2  Bateson, P. (2014), Thirty years of collaboration with Gabriel Horn. Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews 50, 4–11, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.09.019
3  Waddington, C.H. (1957), The Strategy of the Genes. London: Allen & Unwin.
4  Capra, F. & Luisi, P.L. (2014), The Systems View of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511895555
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Like a caterpillar metamorphosing into a butterfly, even a human child 
has adaptations to deal with each stage of its life cycle. Sometimes the 
changes from one stage to the next are marked by discontinuities. These 
are the subject of Chapter 4.
Despite the changes in the individual’s repertoire of behaviour as it 
grows up, early experience can have long lasting effects on its preferences 
and habits when it finally matures. These aspects of its behaviour are 
often very stable, but in stressful conditions they may change when 
the stress is accompanied by new forms of experience. The change is 
usually adaptive to cope with a world that may be very different from 
the one in which the individual grew up. The phenomenon is explored 
in Chapter 5.
In mammals, parent and offspring are often thought to be in 
conflict. The communication between them takes the form of mutual 
manipulation. The offspring seeks to gain maximum advantage from 
its parent, and the parent seeks to defend its long-term reproductive 
interests if it is able to have more than one offspring. This argument is 
explored in Chapter 6 after a brief review of the nature of communication 
in animals. The conclusion is that parents do well to take into account 
the condition of their offspring and the offspring must likewise pay 
attention to the condition of their parent.
Many animals choose their mates carefully. This is especially true 
in birds and many mammals. Inbreeding has costs but so too does 
outbreeding too much. The way in which an optimal balance is achieved 
is in part by the experience of close kin in early life. The role of imprinting-
like processes is described in Chapter 7. Is avoidance of inbreeding the 
same as the avoidance of incest found in most human societies? I argue 
that it is not. The taboos may be an expression of conformism directed 
at individuals doing what most people would not do.
The enormous success of molecular biology has led to the prominence 
given to the role of genes in development. Genes in their different guises 
are unquestionably needed for the inheritance of much behaviour. I 
argue in Chapter 8 that the importance of genes does not mean that a 
simple link can be found between genes and behaviour. Unfortunate 
metaphors such as genes providing a blueprint for behaviour have 
proved extremely misleading. I return to the theme, first outlined 
in Chapter 3, that understanding development requires a systems 
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approach which takes into account all the genes and environmental 
inputs that affect development.
Organisms do not simply react to changes in the environment. They 
play an active role in choosing and controlling the optimal conditions 
for themselves. By their activities in early life they prepare themselves 
for becoming an adult. An important aspect of such behaviour is play. 
This is a subject that formed another part of my own research life.5 These 
aspects of behaviour are discussed in Chapter 9 and provide a bridge to 
the next chapter.
Organisms’ adaptability provides a major part of the link between 
development and evolution. This link is the subject of Chapter 10. Of 
central importance is understanding the relationship between what an 
individual does and how its activities might influence the genomes of 
its descendants. This issue is still a relatively under-researched area 
because development and evolution have usually been thought to be 
separate topics.
In the final chapter I pull the threads together. Inevitably many 
aspects of behavioural development are omitted.6 My book presents an 
approach that is deeply embedded in ethology7 as I attempt to bring 
together many of the factors that affect the development of behaviour. 
I then relate the results to their function and their role in biological 
evolution. The changes in thinking have important implications for the 
relations between the biological and social sciences. 
My original intention in planning this book was to republish essays 
that had first appeared in multi-authored books. I am not alone in 
rarely reading such chapters written by others so I can hardly complain 
if others do not cite my chapters. As I started work, I felt the need to 
rewrite the essays in order to make a more cohesive book. I also wanted 
the ideas to be available to a wide group of people who are interested 
5  Bateson, P. (2015), Playfulness and creativity. Current Biology 25:1, R12-R16, https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2014.09.009
6  Many accessible essays about behavioural development are given in Blumberg, 
M.S., Spencer, J.P. & Shenk, D. (eds.) (2016), How We Develop: Developmental Systems 
and the Emergence of Behavior. WIREs Cognitive Science.
7  Bateson, P. (2015), Human evolution and development: an ethological perspective.
In: Overton, W.F. & Molenaar, P.C.M. (eds.), Handbook of Child Psychology and 
Developmental Science. Vol. 1: Theory and Method. 7th ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, pp. 
208–243.
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in where our behaviour comes from and what effects behaviour has on 
evolution. I stripped out much of the scholarly apparatus such as long 
lists in the text of authors whose work I had depended upon. I also 
disregarded potential accusations of self-plagiarism since much of the 
material would not otherwise have been available to the public.
Inevitably I am indebted to a large number of friends and colleagues 
for their influence on my thought. I want to mention here some 
people for whom I have special affection and to whom I am especially 
indebted. These are Niko Tinbergen,8 Robert Hinde9 and Gabriel Horn.10 
In different ways they provided the inspiration for a major part of my 
own research.
8  In my first year at Cambridge I went to the Edward Grey Institute student conference 
held each year in Oxford. Chris Plowright, who was also at the conference, and I 
hatched a plan to take an expedition to Spitsbergen to study the rare Ivory Gull. 
Niko Tinbergen, who was engaged in a comparative study of gull behaviour was 
keen to join us because Ivory Gulls often nest on cliffs and might have special 
cliff-nesting adaptations. Niko spent considerable time with us, planning what we 
should do. To our sorrow and his, he was prevented by illness from joining the 
expedition. When we returned, he gave us much help as we wrote up our results 
for publication. After that experience, I was set on doing research for a doctorate 
with him at Oxford and in my final year as an undergraduate spent some time at 
his field site. In the end, however, I stayed in Cambridge to do my post-graduate 
research. But Niko’s interest in the biological function of behaviour remained with 
me thereafter. 
9  Robert Hinde supervised my postgraduate research on behavioural imprinting. 
He was a superb supervisor, taking tremendous trouble over the written work of 
his research students. He taught us how to think. Robert exerted an extraordinary 
influence on ethology, primatology and latterly on studies of human behavioural 
biology and development. He wanted his research to be of use to humanity and had 
a deep concern about the causes of aggression and the peculiarly human institution 
of war. He was a wonderful friend and colleague throughout my career.
10  Gabriel Horn had a long-standing interest in the brain going back to his student 
days at Birmingham where he had written a brilliant essay on the neurological 
basis of thought. He had been working on attention and habituation but was very 
interested in the effects of learning on the nervous system. I met him for the first 
time at a dinner in our Cambridge college where we were both Fellows. As Gabriel 
and I talked animatedly, we realised that imprinting in naïve chicks would be 
an excellent form of learning in which to study the neural basis of memory. We 
agreed to work together. Thus started a warm and lasting friendship and scientific 
collaboration that continued for the next thirty years.
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I have co-authored three books with Paul Martin11 who was originally 
my student and, for some years afterwards, my colleague. After leaving 
academia, he continued to publicise many different aspects of science 
in outstanding surveys.12 The books he wrote with me were genuinely 
collaborative and his stimulation and good sense were invaluable in our 
joint projects. I am deeply grateful to him, all the more so because he 
commented on a complete draft of this book. Much of what we wrote 
about both together and separately pertains to human existence. These 
topics are taken up in many of the chapters in this book. Another dear 
friend Michael Yudkin also read critically the whole draft of the book, 
not once but twice, and my gratitude to him is profound.
Patrick Bateson 
Cambridge, October 2016
11  Bateson, P. & Martin, P. (1999), Design for a Life: How Behaviour Develops. London: 
Jonathan Cape. Martin, P. & Bateson. P. (2007), Measuring Behaviour: An Introductory 
Guide. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9780511810893. Bateson, P. & Martin, P. (2013), Play, Playfulness, Creativity 
and Innovation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/
cbo9781139057691
12  Martin, P. (1997), The Sickening Mind: Brain, Behaviour, Immunity and Disease. 
London: HarperCollins. Martin, P. (2002), Counting Sheep: The Science and Pleasures 
of Sleep and Dreams. London: HarperCollins. Martin, P. (2005), Making Happy People: 
The Nature of Happiness and its Origins in Childhood. London: Fourth Estate. Martin, 
P. (2008), Sex, Drugs & Chocolate: The Science of Pleasure. London: Fourth Estate.

1. Appearance of Design1
In everyday life design implies a beneficial means to an end. The idea of 
design has been central to much discussion in biology. Bishop William 
Paley in the early nineteenth century wrote about the reactions of a person 
discovering a watch on a mountainside, pondering on how it was made.2 
Paley wrote: ‘It is the suitableness of these parts to one another; first, in 
the succession and order in which they act; and, secondly, with a view 
to the effect finally produced’. Paley emphasized how different parts of 
an animal’s body relate to each other and contribute to the whole.3 He 
regarded the design he saw everywhere in nature as proof of the existence 
1  This chapter is taken in part from Bateson, P. & Martin, P. (1999), Design for a Life 
London: Jonathan Cape, pp. 95-101.
2  Paley, W. (1802), Natural Theology. London: Faulder.
3  Paley illustrated his idea of relations by considering the various features of the mole:
‘The strong short legs of that animal, the palmated feet armed with sharp nails, the 
pig-like nose, the teeth, the velvet coat, the small external ear, the sagacious smell, the 
sunk protected eye, all conduce to the utilities or to the safety of its underground life. 
… The mole did not want to look about it; nor would a large advanced eye have been 
easily defended from the annoyance to which the life of the animal must constantly 
expose it. How indeed was the mole, working its way under ground, to guard its eyes 
at all? In order to meet this difficulty, the eyes are made scarcely larger than the head 
of a corking-pin; and these minute globules are sunk so deeply in the skull, and lie 
so sheltered within the velvet of its covering, as that any contraction of what may 
be called the eye-brows, not only closes up the apertures which lead to the eyes, but 
presents a cushion, as it were, to any sharp or protruding substance which might push 
against them. This aperture, even in its ordinary state, is like a pin-hole in a piece of 
velvet, scarcely pervious to loose paricles of earth. Observe then, in this structure, that 
which we call relation. There is no natural connection between a small sunk eye and 
shovel palmated foot. Palmated feet might have been joined with goggle eyes; or small 
eyes might have been joined with feet of any other form. What was it therefore which 
brought them together in the mole? That which brought together the barrel, the chain, 
and the cogs, in a watch—design; and design, in both cases, inferred from the relation 
which the parts bear to one another in the prosecution of a common purpose. …
In a word; the feet of the mole are made for digging; the neck, nose, eyes, ears, and 
skin are peculiarly adapted to an underground life; and this is what I call relation’.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.01
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of God. These days few biologists would try to pin their religious faith, if 
they have any, on biological evidence, and the apparent design to which 
Paley referred would be attributed instead to the evolutionary mechanism 
which Charles Darwin called natural selection.
Charles Darwin in old age. Line 
drawing adapted from a photograph 





Darwin’s theory of evolution 
by natural selection is universally 
accepted among serious biologists 
(except for a few so-called 
creationist scientists), even if 
arguments continue over the 
details. Darwin proposed a 
three-stage cycle that starts with 
variation in the form and behaviour 
of individuals. In any given set 
of environmental conditions 
some individuals are better able 
to survive and reproduce than 
others because of their distinctive 
characteristics. The historical 
process of becoming adapted 
notches forward a step if the factors 
that gave rise to those distinctive 
characteristics are inherited in the 
course of reproduction. Suppose, 
for example, that an individual bacterium happens to have heritable 
characteristics that make it resistant to an antibiotic. While all the 
others are killed by the antibiotic, this one will survive and multiply 
rapidly. Before long, the world is full of antibiotic-resistant bacteria. 
Darwinian evolution requires no unconscious motives for propagation 
— let alone conscious ones. 
Biologists should not write evolutionary accounts in which the past 
is seen as leading purposefully towards the goal of the present blissful 
state of perfection. A clear distinction is necessarily and wisely drawn 
between the present-day utility (or function) of a biological process, 
structure or behaviour pattern, and its historical, evolutionary origins. 
Darwin noted, for example, that while the bony plates of the mammalian 
skull allow the young mammal an easier passage through the mother’s 
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birth canal, these same plates are also present in the mammals’ egg-
laying reptilian ancestors. Their original biological function clearly 
must have been different from their current function.
The distinction between current function and historical evolution 
is all the more necessary because current adaptations may result from 
the experience of the individual during its lifetime. Human hands 
form calluses to protect against mechanical wear, and muscles develop 
in response to the specific loads placed upon them during exercise. 
Behaviour, in particular, becomes adapted to local conditions during 
the course of an individual’s development, whether through learning 
by trial and error or through copying others. These are all examples of 
adaptations that are acquired during the lifetime of the individual, and 
they are clearly distinct from adaptations that are inherited.
An important advance in thinking was made by the Nobel Prize 
winner, Niko Tinbergen.4 He pointed out that a number of fundamentally 
different types of question may be asked when studying behaviour. 
‘How does it work?’ ‘How did it develop?’ ‘What is it for?’ and ‘How 
did it evolve?’ In the case of fully-formed behaviour, questions to do 
with control and function are current, whereas questions to do with 
evolution and development are historical. 
Tinbergen’s distinctions can be illustrated with a commonplace 
example. Suppose drivers are asked why they stop their cars at red 
traffic lights. One answer would be that a specific visual stimulus—the 
red light—is perceived, processed in the central nervous system and 
reliably elicits a specific response (easing off on the accelerator, applying 
the brake and so on). This would be an explanation in terms of the way 
in which the traffic light controls the behaviour of drivers. A different 
but equally valid answer is that individual drivers have learnt this rule 
by past observation and instruction. This is an explanation in terms of 
development. A functional explanation is that drivers who do not stop 
at red traffic lights are liable to have an accident or, at least, be stopped 
by the police. Finally, an ‘evolutionary’ explanation would deal with the 
4  Tinbergen, N. (1963), On aims and methods of ethology. Zeitschrift für Tierpsychollogie, 
20, 410–433. An appreciation and an update of Tinbergen’s thinking half a century 
later is given in Bateson, P. & Laland, K. (2013), Tinbergen’s four questions: an 
appreciation and an update. Trends in Ecology & Evolution 28, 712–718. 
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historical processes whereby a red light came to be used as a universal 
signal for stopping traffic at road junctions. All four answers are equally 
correct, but they reflect four distinct levels of enquiry about the same 
phenomenon. To use the traffic lights example once again, their efficient 
regulation of the behaviour of drivers suggest that they have been 
designed by human agency—undoubtedly correct in this case. 
The perception that behaviour is designed springs from the relations 
between the behaviour, the circumstances in which it is expressed 
and the resulting consequences. The closeness of the perceived match 
between the tool and the job for which it is required is relative. In human 
design, the best that one person can do will be exceeded by somebody 
with superior technology. If you were on a picnic with a bottle of wine 
stoppered with a cork but had no corkscrew, one of your companions 
might use a strong stick to push the cork into the bottle. If you had 
never seen this done before, you might be impressed by the choice of 
a rigid tool small enough to get inside the neck of the bottle. The tool 
would be an adaptation of a kind. Tools that are better adapted to the 
job of removing corks from wine bottles are available, of course, and an 
astonishing array of devices have been invented. One ingenious solution 
involved a pump and a hollow needle with a hole near the pointed end; 
the needle was pushed through the cork and air was pumped into the 
bottle, forcing the cork out. Sometimes, however, the bottle exploded 
and this tool quickly became extinct. As with human tools, what is 
perceived as good biological design may be superseded by an even 
better design, or the same solution may be achieved in different ways.
The proposition that living organisms’ bodies, brains and behaviour 
were adapted over the course of evolution and by their suitability to 
the conditions in which they live is familiar to most non-biologists. An 
adaptation is a characteristic of an organism that makes the organism 
better suited to survive and reproduce in a particular environment—
better suited, that is, than if it lacked the crucial feature.
Design of machines
Within an individual, as well as between individuals, different systems 
of behaviour are variable both in their development and in their 
organisation. Some insight into why this should be may be obtained by 
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looking at machines. Tailoring a system to a specified job while building 
in flexibility is a problem that human designers of machines must face 
again and again. Robots with even simple forms of regulation do things 
that look remarkably life-like. Similarly, in a game like chess simple 
rules can generate games of great complexity. 
The difficult challenge for the designers of chess-playing computers 
is to beat the creativity, flair and imagination of a chess Grandmaster. 
IBM rose to the chess challenge and started its Deep Blue project in 
1989.5 The Deep Blue computer relied on massive parallel arrays with 
dedicated hardware and software. It had 256 chess-specific processor 
chips operating in tandem, each capable of analysing up to three 
million chess moves every second. The whole array could process 
50–100 billion moves in the three minutes allotted for each move. It 
was also equipped with an enormous database of Grandmaster games 
played in the previous century.
5  Bateson, P. & Martin, P. (1999), Design for a Life. London: Jonathan Cape, pp. 96–97.
The World Chess Champion Garry Kasparov 
played successfully against IBM’s Deep Blue 
computer but was beaten by the next version, 
Deeper Blue. Photo by Jürg Vollmer (2009), 
Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
maiakinfo/3858951927, CC BY-SA 2.0.
In the initial stages of the 
project no attempt was made to 
mimic human thought. Without 
any ‘psychology’ to mess things 
up, the machine would never 
get tired or make a silly mistake. 
It would instead depend for its 
success on raw computing power 
and its enormous memory. In one 
second Deep Blue could search 
ahead through several hundred 
million possible moves, while its 
human opponent, the Russian 
Grandmaster and one-time World 
Champion, Gary Kasparov, could 
analyse only one or two. Kasparov 
himself admitted that quantity 
sometimes becomes quality. But he 
had the compensatory benefits of 
intuition, judgment and experience. 
14 Behaviour, Development and Evolution
Compared to computers, humans calculate slowly, but are good at 
recognising patterns. Chess Grandmasters are much better than novice 
players at remembering patterns of pieces from real games, but no better 
at remembering arbitrary patterns. Experience helps them to remember 
patterns that have meaning and link these with the sequences of moves 
that have the best pay-off in the long run. The surprising consequence 
is that humans see traps that lie beyond the search horizon of even an 
exceedingly fast computer.
In 1996 Kasparov played Deep Blue in a six-game match. Kasparov 
lost the first game, but then put his human skill to good effect and went 
on to win the match. He was able to do this because he could adapt 
his strategy in response to what he discovered were weaknesses in his 
machine opponent. Deep Blue, on the other hand, could not respond 
to the overview of its human opponent. IBM rose to the new challenge. 
Deeper Blue, their 1997 successor to Deep Blue, was faster and smarter.
In particular, it could modify its basic strategy between tournaments 
in response to the playing style of its human adversary. This time the 
machine managed, albeit with some difficulty, to win the next match 
against Kasparov. 
These chess matches emphasised how important adaptability is in 
such competitions. An interesting development has been the cooperation 
between machine and humans.6 Amateur chess players coached their 
laptop computers to explore deeply specific positions using human 
pattern recognition together with their computers’ computational 
power. The resulting combination overcame in competition the superior 
chess knowledge of grandmasters and the superior computational 
power of big computers. Average players with average machines beat 
the best players and the best machines. 
In more practical uses, such as the control of traffic flow by 
co-ordinating the switching of traffic lights or regulating speed limits, 
a capacity to adapt to new situations is desirable. Faced with novelty, 
such systems must not change everything at once. If they did, they 
would quickly collapse into chaotic malfunctioning. So, as with animals, 
buffering some aspects of the computer’s capacities from change is 
6  See Shyam Sankar, The rise of human-computer cooperation, TED talk (June 2012), 
http://www.ted.com/speakers/shyam_sankar
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crucial. These essential capacities must continue to function in the same 
way despite radical changes in input. Life brings many requirements. 
Impressive though IBM’s Deeper Blue computer was, it was 
dedicated to one complicated but narrowly defined task—playing chess. 
Gary Kasparov may have met his match on the chess board, but he 
was able to do a great many other complicated things of which Deeper 
Blue was incapable. He could make decisions about chess matches 
and holidays that he would take years into the future. He could run a 
complicated social life and allocate time to his main biological appetites, 
none of which were shared with Deeper Blue. He could feel moved by 
patriotism or spiritual feelings. He could write books and enjoy music. 
From time to time, he doubtless reflected on his life and his character. 
Conflicts in motivation
Kasparov like every other human and every other animal, had many 
strands to his life. The systems that are involved in running each of these 
aspects sometimes seem to be semi-autonomous, usually functioning 
smoothly together but occasionally coming into conflict. Humans feel 
the conflict most strongly, perhaps, in times of war, when their craving 
for leadership and their identification with their own group, tribe or 
nation conflicts with their peace-time commitments and pleasures 
and, indeed, perception of their own self-preservation. But everybody 
feels the pull, on most days of even the most routine life, between 
incompatible activities. You can’t eat and sleep at the same time; you 
can’t have a warm shower and take a walk simultaneously—except 
perhaps during a cloud burst in the tropics.
Much of animal and human behaviour and physiology operates 
on the basis that considerable autonomy has seemingly been designed 
into each behavioural system or organ. Interaction necessarily occurs 
between them to prevent total breakdown when the different parts pull 
in different directions. A problem of great interest to engineers has been 
how far machines should emulate biology, using specialised modules 
like those in the brain that are dedicated to particular jobs such as 
recognising faces. How far should the modules be built into separately 
organised systems, each competing for time when they cannot operate 
simultaneously? Should a ‘boss’ allocate priority where it is impossible 
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for two activities to occur at the same time? Or should a decision to 
express a particular form of behaviour depend on weighting the needs 
of competing systems? 
Designers of intelligent machines often opt for distributed control, 
known as heterarchy7 (as opposed to hierarchy), because of the efficiency 
it brings. The solutions to the problems of running a smart machine, 
or an individual life, are also found in the management of human 
organisations. In contrast with traditional hierarchical bureaucracies, 
modern public and commercial institutions increasingly tend to have 
structures and organisational cultures that focus on tasks or projects. 
The emphasis is on getting the job done efficiently, and this is achieved 
by bringing together groups of people with the right knowledge and 
skills. Expertise and teamwork are what counts, rather than formal 
status. The organizational structure tends to be a matrix of project 
teams rather than a traditional top-down hierarchy. Such management 
relies on great flexibility and considerable autonomy for each part of the 
organisation, with exchange of information and competition occurring 
when the well-being of the whole demands it. The central control over 
day-to-day work is minimal and the ways in which each team is set up 
depends on the need.
How do animals achieve comparable solutions in the development 
and integration of their behaviour? The ultimate arbiter of priority 
in organising their own behaviour is reproductive success. The 
consequences of giving priority to this aspect of their biology are 
sometimes astonishing—at least when judged from a human perspective. 
The male emperor penguin brooding his mate’s egg over the Antarctic 
winter cannot be relieved by his mate because the growth of the ice shelf 
puts the sea and food beyond reach. So, in the interests of producing 
an offspring, he fasts for months—a feat any human would find 
impossible. Other potential solutions to this problem, such as shorter 
stints of brooding and trekking repeatedly across the ice shelf during 
the winter, presumably proved to be less successful. The penguins that 
fasted all winter were the ones whose ancestors had best survived with 
this adaptation. Examples like this emphasise how dependent is the 
organisation of behaviour on the ecology of the species. Differences 
between individuals in the processes of development are to be expected.
7  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heterarchy
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Conclusions
The developmental progression from a single cell to an integrated 
body of billions of cells, combining to produce coherent behaviour, is 
astonishingly orderly. Just as animals grow kidneys with a specialised 
biological function, adapted to the conditions in which they live, so 
they perform elaborate and adaptive behaviour patterns without any 
previous opportunities for learning or practice. Particular behaviour 
patterns are like body organs in serving particular biological functions; 
their structure is often likely to have been adapted to its present use 
by Darwinian evolution and by their adaptability. It depends on the 
ecology of the animal. Their structure and behaviour develop in a highly 
coordinated and systematic way. 
From the standpoint of design, systems of behaviour that serve 
different biological functions, such as cleaning the body or finding 
food, should not be expected to develop in the same way. In particular, 
the role of experience is likely to vary considerably from one type of 
behaviour to another. In predatory species, such as cats, cleaning the 
body is not generally something that needs special skills tailored to local 
conditions, whereas capturing fast-moving prey requires considerable 
learning and practice to be successful. The osprey snatching trout from 
the water does not develop that ability overnight. Animals that rely 
upon highly sophisticated predatory skills, such as birds of prey, suffer 
high mortality when young and those that survive are often unable to 
breed for several years because they have to hone their skills before they 
can capture enough prey to feed offspring. In such cases, a combination 
of different developmental processes is required in order to generate the 
highly tuned skills seen in the adult.
Retaining the concept of design brings with it insights that biologists 
might well not have had without it. Even so, its use generates an 
unforeseen problem in the current world. The pre-Darwinian ideas 
about intelligent design have been taken up by the creationists in their 
attempts to disguise their beliefs as a form of science. As a result all sorts 
of unpalatable associations are brought up in the minds of biologists 
when they hear the word ‘design’. In attempts to make accessible 
complicated processes intelligible, various devices are used—like 
attributing metaphorical intentions to genes (see Chapter 8) or to the 
weather. These linguistic devices are easily misunderstood. The take 
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home message is, then, that when using a term like design, which 
means different things to different people, great efforts must be made 
to ensure the language is not taken too literally. The design in biology 
is only apparent, but shorn of its religious connotations, understanding 
the relations between the parts of an organism remains as useful as ever.
2. Imprinting and Attachment1
Imprinting provides a striking example of the way in which a particular 
experience has a specific effect only when the animal is at a certain 
stage of behavioural development. Indeed, the regulation of imprinting 
predisposes many species of bird to learn the characteristics of their 
parent at what would appear to be the biologically appropriate time 
in their life cycles. It is a good example of how behaviour gives the 
appearance of being well designed to serve the needs of the young birds.
1  Much of this chapter is based on an updated version of Bateson, P. (1973), Internal 
influences on early learning in birds. In: R.A. Hinde and J. Stevenson Hinde (eds.), 
Constraints on Learning: Limitations and Predispositions. London: Academic Press, pp. 
101–116, with thanks to the Master and Fellows of St John’s College, Cambridge.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.02
 A Mallard Duck hen calls vigorously as she leads her ducklings who have already formed an 
attachment to her. Photo by Crystal Marie Lopez (2010), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
labellavida/4697991484, CC BY-ND 2.0.
Even though birds like domestic chicks and mallard ducklings, the 
species most commonly used in studies of imprinting, respond to 
a wide range of objects before they have formed an attachment, they 
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respond much more strongly to some than to others. This selective 
responsiveness is a major constraint on what is readily learnt in the 
imprinting situation. The characteristics of the stimuli that are most 
effective in eliciting social behaviour in naïve birds vary from species 
to species. In general stimuli that resemble most appropriate biological 
objects are preferred by naïve chicks and ducklings more strongly than 
those that don’t.2
One feature of imprinting is its apparent restriction to a brief period 
early in life. At one time it was supposed that a window opened on the 
external world and then closed again. While the window was open the 
young animal was affected by certain types of experience and at other 
times it was not. This interpretation did not follow from the evidence. 
While maturational changes, occurring independently of specific 
experience, have been implicated in its onset,3 the sensitive period is 
brought to an end by a specific type of experience. Birds become familiar 
with their immediate environment, whether this be their mother, other 
chicks, or even the walls of their isolation cage, and come to discriminate 
between such stimuli and other things that are novel to them. When they 
can tell the difference, they avoid the strange object and subsequently 
2  Day-old domestic chicks trained with a flashing, rotating light or with a rotating 
stuffed jungle fowl, the ancestral species of domestic fowl, and then given a choice 
between them did not differ in their preferences. The stuffed jungle fowl became 
more attractive than the box by the second day after hatching. The shift towards a 
stronger fowl bias was also apparent in birds that had been imprinted with either 
a fowl or a box. Features of the jungle fowl that make it especially attractive as the 
predisposition emerges are located around the head. They are not specific to jungle 
fowl since the heads of a stuffed duck and small predator were equally attractive. 
Under laboratory conditions, the necessary feature detectors for head and neck 
evidently take longer to develop than do the ones driven by flashing lights and 
movement. Johnson, M.H. & Horn, G. (1988), Development of filial preferences 
in dark-reared chicks. Anim. Behav. 36.3, 675–683, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0003-
3472(88)80150-7. Vallortigara, G., Regolin, L. & Marconnato, F. (2005) in Visually 
inexperienced chicks exhibit spontaneous preference for biological motion patterns 
(PloS Biol. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pbio.0030208), found that animation 
sequences of point-light-displays in which a few light points are placed on the 
joints of a digitalized image of a moving hen were more attractive to naïve chicks 
than the same points of light upside down. The spatial relational properties of the 
imprinting object have proved to be important (Martinho, A. III & Kacelnik, A. 
(2016), Ducklings imprint on the relational concept of ‘same or different’. Science 
353.6296, 286–288, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf4247).
3  Experience before hatching is important. When the unhatched chick starts to vocalise, 
its calls facilitate the preference for the maternal call after hatching (Gottlieb, G. 
(1988), Development of species identification in ducklings: XV. Individual auditory 
recognition. Devel. Psychbiol. 21.6, 509–522, https://doi.org/10.1002/dev.420210602).
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show no evidence of having developed a preference for it. The end of the 
sensitive period does not mark the point at which learning is complete; 
it merely marks the point at which the young bird is able to discriminate 
between stimuli that it has already experienced and other objects.4
Imprinting is an example of tightly constrained learning. Paradoxically, 
its general interest lies in its particularity. The predispositions to respond 
to particular features and give particular responses to the stimulus 
are central in the case of imprinting. Processes that change as a result 
of experience are dependent on features that have developed before 
imprinting has taken place. In other examples of learning that have 
different functions and are involved in different motivational systems the 
inter-dependence is less obvious, but present nonetheless. The differences 
in the ways in which animals learn can be explained in terms of variation 
in the perceptual and motivational mechanisms used in the various 
contexts in which learning occurs. In general, the properties of the whole 
animal allow for the evolution of differences in function. 
Attachment in humans
Analogies between imprinting in birds and the development of 
attachments in humans have been drawn, particularly by the great 
psychiatrist John Bowlby.5 The day-old baby is affected by her auditory 
experience before birth and she prefers the sound of her mother’s voice to 
that of other women. She has a clear predisposition to respond to face-like 
images and rapidly develops a preference for the details of her mother’s 
face. She makes much effort to maintain contact with her mother and is 
upset when the behavioural exchange with the mother is disrupted.6 
4  Bateson, P. (1979), How do sensitive periods arise and what are they for? Anim. 
Behav. 27.2, 470–486, https://doi.org/10.1016/0003-3472(79)90184-2. For a more recent 
review of sensitive periods in the development of brain and behaviour see Knudsen, 
E.I. (2004), Sensitive Periods in the Development of the Brain and Behavior. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 16.8, 1412–1425, https://doi.org/10.1162/0898929042304796
5  Bowlby, J. (1969), Attachment and Loss. Vol. 1: Attachment. London: Hogarth Press. 
Bowlby was concerned to provide an empirical basis to the field of psychoanalysis. 
6  The elegant work of Murray, L., & Trevarthen, C. (1986), The infant’s role in mother-
infant communications. J. Child Language 13.1, 15–29, https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0305000900000271 showed that a two month old baby would respond normally to 
the face of her mother on a TV screen but was upset when a time delay was inserted 
between her behaviour and that of her mother.
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The human mother and her child have formed 
a strong attachment to each other. Photo by Bob 
Whitehead (2006), Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/
photos/kryten/125710155, CC BY 2.0.
The dynamics of her social 
relationships as she develops 
is the subject of much 
research. In this respect the 
work on imprinting in birds 
and the development of 
social attachments in children 
have diverged. The work on 
imprinting in birds has been 
focused on those species that 
are feathered and active in 
early life, with particular 
attention paid to the detailed 
mechanisms involved. The 
work on attachment processes 
in humans has focused on the 
ramifying consequences of the child’s experiences on her subsequent 
behaviour.7 As so often happens, the bodies of knowledge have 
separated and attempts to bring them together have often been at a 
superficial level. Nevertheless, the general conceptual questions have 
value inside the various silos of knowledge. 
Imprinting in the wild
The conditions under which imprinting is studied in the laboratory 
are necessarily impoverished and artificial. The results can give a 
seriously misleading view of what happens in the wild. Chicks and 
ducklings spend most of the daylight hours on the first day after 
hatching being brooded by their mothers. The little birds hardly 
seemed to pay her any attention. Their activity around the hen does 
increase substantially on the second day after hatching, or even later if 
the ambient temperature is low. 
Although the development of new preferences is initially prevented 
by escape from novelty or by the low level of social responsiveness to 
7  Holmes, J. (2010), Exploring in Security: Towards an Attachment-informed Psychoanalytic 
Psychotherapy. London: Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203856321
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unfamiliar things, enforced contact may wear down these behavioural 
constraints to the point where the bird does develop a new preference. 
This flexibility could be of some functional importance in colonial 
nesting species such as gulls. In the absence of parents, for which the 
young bird forms its strongest preference, the bird may still be able to 
survive by responding socially to other adults and inducing them to 
feed it. 
Even in the laboratory, when a recently hatched mallard duckling 
or domestic chick, which has been sitting quietly in a dark incubator, is 
removed and alley at room temperature, it soon begins to move about. 
Before long it starts emitting shrill peeps, often referred to as ‘distress’ 
calling, and it shuffles about in disorientated fashion with its neck 
extended. If a conspicuous visual stimulus is now presented to the bird, 
it orientates towards the stimulus and its distress calling stops. In many 
ways, its behaviour resembles that of a bird that has become separated 
from its mother, vigorously searching for her. 
Such an observation suggests that even before they have been 
imprinted, the bird will behave in a way that increases the likelihood of 
their making visual contact with their parent or a surrogate.8 The animal 
plays an active part in determining the kinds of things that it will learn 
and will continue to do so even after the imprinting process is under way. 
The bird cannot predict what the back view of its mother is like from 
knowledge of her front view. If a bird that has formed an attachment to 
an individual can respond selectively to that individual regardless of its 
orientation, then the bird must have been exposed to all those views of 
the parent that it can subsequently identify. It has built up a composite 
picture of its parent’s characteristics. In the normal course of events, the 
mother will probably present many different aspects of herself during 
the attachment process while the young are learning her characteristics. 
Assurance would be made doubly certain if, after learning a certain 
8  If stimuli that are highly effective in the imprinting situation do bring such 
searching behaviour to an end, they might be expected to reward the young bird. 
Naïve domestic chicks and wild mallard ducklings taken from a dark incubator 
quickly learn to operate a pedal that turns on a flashing rotating light. Age, and 
prior experience, affect the ability of domestic chicks to learn the pedal-pressing 
task in the same way as they affect the imprinting process (Bateson, P. & Reese, 
E.P. (1969), The reinforcing properties of conspicuous stimuli in the imprinting 
situation. Anim. Behav. 17, 692–699, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0003-3472(69)80014-x).
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amount about her, the young actively worked to present themselves 
with a different view.9 The active element in the young bird’s behaviour 
makes the attachment process much more flexible and adaptive than 
it would have been if the bird had simply locked on to the first thing it 
saw and attempted to maintain contact with that and nothing else. 
The incisive, single-shot image conjured up by the term ‘imprinting’ 
does not adequately represent what happens. Clearly, acquisition of the 
complex pattern recognition involved in detecting a particular parent 
or surrogate from many different angles and distances takes some time. 
Imprinting with two objects presented in rapid alternation can have a 
retarding effect on rewarded discrimination learning.10 It is as though 
the stimuli are classified together and come to share the same identity. 
This could be an integral part of the imprinting situation where the 
young animal has to build up a composite picture of its parent as it 
obtains the opportunity to view the parent at various angles. 
The advantages of doing this are not restricted to the attachment 
process. Classification together of physically different stimuli may 
well be necessary for some of the more complex examples of ‘concept 
formation’, even though abstraction of common features of different 
stimuli and generalisation from familiar to novel stimuli are also likely 
to be involved. The process may also play a larger part in human 
perception than personal experience suggests — introspection being a 
poor guide to the distinctions ignored in existing classifications.
Individual recognition
Filial imprinting and sexual imprinting have certain things in common 
even though sexual imprinting takes place later in development than 
filial imprinting.11 Both filial and sexual imprinting have evolved 
to enable birds to recognise their close kin, but the necessity for kin 
recognition is different in young and adult. The young bird needs to 
9  Jackson, P.S. & Bateson, P. Imprinting and exploration of slight novelty in chicks. 
Nature, 251.5476, 609–610, https://doi.org/10.1038/251609a0 
10  Bateson, P. In Heyes, C. & Huber, L. (eds.), The Evolution of Cognition. Cambridge, 
MA: MIT Press, 2000. pp. 85–102.
11  Vidal, J.-M. (1980), The relations between filial and sexual imprinting in the domestic 
fowl: Effects of age and social experience. Anim. Behav., 28.3, 880–891, https://doi.
org/10.1016/s0003-3472(80)80148-5 
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discriminate between the parent that cares for it and other members of 
its species because parents discriminate between their own offspring 
and other young of the same species, and may attack young that are not 
their own. Adult behaviour of this kind is well known in many mammals 
and birds. In most cases the parent that cares exclusively for its own 
young will be more likely to rear them to independence than a parent 
that accepts and cares for any young that come up to it. The suggestion 
is, then, that filial imprinting is required for individual recognition of 
parents and is a secondary consequence of the evolutionary pressures 
on parents to discriminate between their own and other young. In each 
generation individuals may differ in the stage of development when 
their filial responsiveness to parent-like objects first increases. Those that 
do it too early obtain inappropriate or insufficient information about 
their parents. They might, for instance, have inadequate opportunities 
to explore all facets of their parent and so fail to recognise it quickly 
enough later on when quick recognition is important. Those that do 
it too late respond in a friendly way to hostile members of their own 
species and consequently suffer attacks. In these different ways the 
optimal timing for the increase in intrinsic responsiveness could have 
evolved. It would be critically affected by how rapidly the parents learn 
to discriminate between their own young and other young.
The evolutionary pressures that give rise to sexual imprinting are 
likely to have been quite different. Sexual imprinting enables an animal 
to learn the characteristics of its close kin and subsequently choose 
a mate that appears slightly different (but not too different) from its 
parents and siblings (see Chapter 7).
Conclusions
Imprinting is an example of tightly constrained learning. The 
predispositions to respond to particular features and give particular 
responses to the stimulus are central to understanding what happens. 
The robust processes of development make possible the plastic changes 
in behaviour that follow.  Processes that change as a result of experience 
are dependent on features that have developed before imprinting has 
taken place. In other examples of learning that have different functions 
and are involved in different motivational systems the interdependence 
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is less obvious, but present nonetheless. The differences in the ways 
in which animals learn can be explained in terms of variation in the 
perceptual and motivational mechanisms used in the various contexts 
in which learning occurs. In general, the properties of the whole animal 
allow for the evolution of differences in function.  Imprinting is a good 
example of how bringing together all the factors known to affect it 
provides a systems approach to development. It also has the appearance 
of being well designed for the needs of the animal.
3. Rules and Reciprocity1
The study of development has attracted some of the most bitter and 
protracted controversies in the whole of psychology and ethology. 
The arguments reflected more general ideological battles about nature 
and nurture. Consequently, much research was concerned merely 
to establish that a particular kind of internal or external factor could 
be important, or that evidence could be obtained for a certain logical 
possibility. In recent years, such activity has abated with the growing 
acceptance that both internal and external factors can play important 
roles in the development of any one pattern of behaviour. Also, the air 
has been cleared by the realization that an interest in how behaviour has 
been adapted to its present uses is not the same as an interest in what 
makes one individual animal different from another one. 
Two radically different models have been proposed for what is 
happening when behaviour develops. On one view straightforward 
correspondence can be found between genes and innate behaviour on 
the one hand and between the environment and learned behaviour 
on the other. The word ‘innate’ has many different meanings 
attached to it: present at birth; a behavioural difference caused by a 
genetic difference; adapted over the course of evolution; unchanging 
throughout development; shared by all members of a species; and 
not learned. ‘Instinct’ is deployed in similar ways to innate. When the 
justification for using one of the meanings of innate or instinctive has 
been demonstrated it does not follow that another of the meanings will 
1  Parts of this chapter were taken, with permission, from Bateson, P. (1976), Rules 
and reciprocity in behavioural development. In: P. Bateson & R.A. Hinde (eds.), 
Growing Points in Ethology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 401–421.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.03
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necessarily apply. Even if a behaviour pattern develops without obvious 
practice or example, it may subsequently be modified by learning. For 
instance, a blind baby may start to smile in the same way as a normal 
baby. But that does not mean that later on in their lives, sighted people 
will not modify their smiles to expressions that are characteristic of their 
own culture. A classification of behaviour into innate and not innate 
merely causes confusion.2
The second view of development does not recognize the distinction 
between behaviour that is not learned and behaviour that is acquired. 
It proposes instead that as the animal develops, it is not merely affected 
by its genes and its environment. The animal’s state influences which 
genes are activated from time to time and the animal also alters the 
character of the environment as it develops.3 While such transactions 
of this kind seem reasonable, this second model is often perceived as 
being too complicated and too vague. Such objections start to fall away 
as the nature of developmental processes are unravelled. Gradually 
scientists have become aware that what is needed is an approach that 
will cope with the multiple and variegated nature of the factors that 
make individuals different from each other and the interactions that 
take place between those factors. This amounts to a systems approach. 
Models of development
In a helpful visual aid to the biologist who has difficulty in grasping 
the abstractions of a mathematical model, Waddington4 represented 
the development of a particular part of a fertilised egg as a ball rolling 
down a tilted plane which is increasingly furrowed by valleys. He called 
the surface down which the ball rolls the ‘epigenetic landscape’. The 
essential point is that the mounting constraints on the way tissue can 
develop are represented by the increasing restriction on the sideways 
movement of the ball as it rolls towards the front lower edge of the 
2  A discussion of the concept of innateness is given in Mameli, M. & Bateson, P. (2006), 
Innateness and the Sciences. Biol. Philos. 21.2, 155–188, https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10539-005-5144-0
3  Lehrman, D.S. (1970), Semantic and conceptual issues in the nature–nurture 
problem. In: Aronson, L. Tobach, E. & Rosenblatt, J.S. Development and Evolution of 
Behavior. San Francisco: Freeman, pp. 17–52. 
4  Waddington, C.H. (1957), The Strategy of the Genes. Allen & Unwin: London. 
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landscape. The landscape represents, therefore, the mechanisms that 
regulate development.
Waddington’s model is attractive to the visually minded because it 
provides a way of thinking about developmental pathways and about 
the astonishing capacity of the developing system to right itself after a 
perturbation and return to its former track. To take a specific example 
from post-embryonic development, if a juvenile rat is starved during 
its development, its weight falls while it is being deprived. When it 
is put back onto a normal diet, its weight curve rapidly picks up and 
rejoins the growth curve of the rat that has not been deprived. Similar 
examples of growth spurts after illness are well known in humans. For 
the moment the possibility that the individuals showing the catching-up 
phenomenon may differ in undetected ways from normal individuals 
can be ignored. The prime question is how weight gain is controlled and 
how two individuals with different dietary histories end up weighing 
the same.
The systems theorists have laid considerable emphasis on the self-
correcting features of development, and have called the convergence of 
different routes on the same steady state ‘equifinality’.5 Waddington’s 
epigenetic landscape suggests a way of handling equifinality. If the ball 
rolling down the landscape encounters an obstacle in one of the valleys 
and is not stopped dead, it will ride up round the obstacle and fall back 
into the valley down which it had been rolling.
Waddington’s model is, of course, informal and he would have been 
the first to point to its limitations. It is not difficult to simulate with greater 
rigour a system that compensates for short periods of food deprivation 
during development. If the amount of food an animal attempts to eat is 
determined by a comparison between a predetermined setting and the 
actual weight of the animal and if the value of the preferred weight is 
increased as the animal ages, a model similar to biological reality can be 
obtained. To make things more realistic the predetermined increments 
in the preferred value first increase and then decrease as the hypothetical 
animal gets older. 
By arranging for the preferred value of the closed feedback loop 
to be changed according to some predetermined plan, the system has 
5  Capra, F. & Luisi, P.L. (2014), The Systems View of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511895555
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been made interactive. In the simplest case the developmental process 
is essentially ballistic — its pathway is determined in advance and does 
not depend on a dynamic interaction between the system and other 
factors that might change during the course of development. Even 
rather simple explanations can account for different developmental 
routes leading to precisely the same steady state. The phenomena, which 
were so entrancing to an old-fashioned vitalist, do not pose inordinate 
conceptual problems.
Children differ astonishingly in the age at which language 
development begins. Some may begin before the end of their first year 
and others may not utter a recognisable word until they are three or 
more. Furthermore, during acquisition, styles of forming word patterns 
may be markedly different. Despite these enormous differences, it is 
remarkably difficult to pick out the early developers when the children 
are older. Put cautiously, behaviour at one stage of development is an 
exceedingly poor predictor of behaviour at another. Put more boldly, 
a child which has been initially slow to develop can demonstrate the 
catch-up effect seen in tissue growth and reach the same steady state in 
one aspect of language ability as a more precocious child.
This example from language acquisition can be matched by many 
others from child development, but it is sufficient to demonstrate not 
only the advantages but also the difficulties of employing the concept 
of equifinality in developmental studies of behaviour. Despite practical 
and philosophical difficulties, achieving equifinality in behavioural 
development does not pose insuperable problems of principle. 
Explanations for the control of weight can be readily adapted to 
behavioural examples. The preferred value against which the actual state 
is compared can be for, say, the proprioceptive feedback from a certain 
action or, at another level, the feedback provided by the behaviour of a 
parent. The justification for thinking in these terms is that it provides a 
different perspective from the more conventional interactional approach 
and suggests new ways of looking at the evidence. 
Even a simple way of generating convergence could lead to marked 
differences in the pattern of development even though the final outcome 
was the same. Just as two rats with different food preferences can put on 
weight at the same rate, so different types of action can lead to the same 
behavioural end-point. A feature of a system dependent for its control 
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on feedback is that it need not be fussy about how a match between the 
actual value and the preferred value is achieved. It is the consequences 
of an action that counts, not the precise form and patterning of that 
action. Admittedly, possible courses of action may be so constrained 
that the system is likely to do only one thing when a mismatch between 
the actual state and the preferred value is detected. The constraints need 
not be great. For example quite different combinations of muscles in 
a locust’s leg contract to produce the same overall movement of the 
leg — the explanation being that movement is controlled by means of 
sensory feedback.6
Alternative pathways
Different routes to the same goal may be achieved even more dramatically 
than in the cases already considered if the young individual is equipped 
with two or more alternative systems controlling development of 
the same pattern of behaviour. Redundancy of this kind is common 
enough in man-made machines when lives are at stake, as in an airliner. 
Clearly, redundant developmental systems could be highly adaptive 
for an individual, particularly if the alternative control systems were 
matched to different environmental conditions to which they were 
appropriate — the provision of special horses for particular courses. The 
existence of other systems protects against failure, but from time to time 
individuals are faced with the situation where no amount of tactical 
manoeuvring will enable one of their developing systems to proceed 
along a particular route. Such an individual is a bit like a traveller who 
arrives at a station only to find that the trains have been cancelled. He 
or she can still reach their destination but only by choosing a different 
method of getting there.
If contingency arrangements of this kind have been adapted during 
evolution, Waddington’s epigenetic landscape would have to be 
redrawn so that some valleys ran together again. It could be argued that 
a ball that had descended by one valley had had a different history from 
one that had descended by another so that even though the balls ended 
6  Hoyle, G. (1970), Cellular mechanisms underlying behavior-neuroethology. Adv. 
Insect Physiol. 7, 349–444, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2806(08)60244-1
32 Behaviour, Development and Evolution
up in the same place, the concept of equifinality was valueless. This 
answer would depend on whether the different histories did indeed 
leave distinctive traces on the metaphorical ball. Even if they did, the 
objection might still not be serious since the resulting differences might 
be biologically trivial by comparison with the ultimate similarities.
In other contexts, inputs that may be relatively non-specific are 
frequently required to facilitate the development of particular systems. 
The inputs may be provided by external environmental conditions or by 
feedback from the animal’s activities such as its own vocalisation. It may 
not yet be possible to give a clear instance where different developmental 
control mechanisms generate the same behavioural end-product. 
The biological function of some of the behavioural mechanisms 
found in many developing animals, particularly higher vertebrates, 
is the gathering of information. Their predispositions to learn the 
characteristics of certain things can be highly specific. Such proclivity 
can be extremely important in directing the course of development. A 
good example is provided by the active role of the young precocial bird 
in imprinting (discussed in Chapter 2). This example also illustrates the 
more general point about modifiability of control mechanisms.
Another kind of modification dependent on environmental 
conditions is suggested by the stunting of growth if animals or humans 
are starved for long enough during development. The simple model 
used for the control of weight can be readily adapted to cope with such 
evidence by making the extent of the increments in preferred weight 
dependent on the size of the increments between the preferred weight 
and the actual weight. If the discrepancy is large the increment in 
preferred weight is modified so that it is less than if the discrepancy 
is small. This simple rule, which could be specified in advance, would 
greatly enhance the dynamic interaction with the environment. It would 
have one interesting consequence that would be particularly striking if 
the normal growth curve were sigmoid with the period of maximum 
growth occurring mid-way through development. The stunting effects 
of starvation would be particularly marked at times of rapid growth. 
This would give rise to periods in development when the animal was 
especially vulnerable to environmental disturbance.
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Rules for changing the rules 
The biological advantage of a rule that allows for a change in the 
preferred value is that the animal does not endlessly attempt to reach a 
state that may never be achievable in the particular conditions in which 
it is developing. That the conditions for the development of one system 
are less than optimal does not imply that conditions are bad all round; 
normal development of the individual’s other systems may still be 
possible. Although it may be handicapped, its chances of surviving and 
leaving offspring may not be reduced to nothing.
One behavioural example of settling for less than the best is 
the nest-site choice of the blue tit. In the spring the tits visit a large 
variety of crannies many of which are obviously unsuitable. One way 
of interpreting their behaviour would be that, if the actual site did 
not match up to the characteristics of an optimal nest-site, they kept 
searching — to begin with at least. If optimal sites were unavailable or 
already occupied, the birds would ultimately nest in places they had 
previously rejected. It would make good sense if they were equipped 
with a rule for gradually relaxing the conditions under which searching 
for a nest-site was brought to an end and nest building began. Once 
the bird has selected a sub-optimal site it will, for that breeding season 
at least, prefer it even if an optimal site should subsequently become 
available.
The modification of preferred values can be examined in the context 
of emerging social relationships. Suppose that it is important for the 
maintenance of a relationship between two individuals that they both 
have the same general pattern of behaviour — the same activity rhythm, 
for example. In the early stages of a relationship differences in pattern 
might well exist but these might reflect nothing more than the relatively 
unimportant peculiarities of personal history. 
It might be possible for one or both of the partners to change their 
preferred patterns without cost. If a pattern of behaviour is achieved by 
comparison with a preferred standard, that same standard could also 
be used for judging a companion’s behaviour. Individual A’s standard 
could be changed by individual B’s and vice versa. Any mismatch 
would lead to the individuals breaking-off contact with each other. It 
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would therefore be necessary to provide for a mechanism that would, 
in the early stages of a developing relationship, over-ride or inhibit 
the consequence of a mismatch. For example, two individuals might 
be drawn together by the physical appearance of each other. During 
the ‘honeymoon’ period the relatively subtle differences of behaviour 
would be ignored. It would only be later, when the effects of physical 
appearances had started to wane that a mismatch of behaviour would 
become important and lead to a disruption of the relationship. In the 
intervening period one or both of the individuals could have changed 
its pattern of behaviour so as to correspond to that of the other. The 
flexibility of an individual might be constrained by some social roles 
and facilitated by others.
An example of such behavioural meshing comes from observational 
studies of the relationship that develops between mother and infant 
rhesus monkeys.7 Independent measurements were made when the 
mother left her infant and when the infant left its mother. In some pairs 
the probability that the mother 
would leave the infant at any 
particular moment after they had 
come together was closely related to 
the probability that the infant would 
leave the mother. Such meshing 
could, of course, be obtained in a 
variety of ways. For example, the 
two individuals might become 
highly sensitive to the immediate 
cues provided by their partner. 
If other things are equal, and if 
apparent plasticity of preference 
is not merely elasticity, then the 
pattern of behaviour should be 
maintained for some time in the 
absence of the particular partner 
with which the pattern developed.
7  Hinde, R.A. & Simpson, M.J.A. (1975), Qualities of mother-infant relationships in 
monkeys. Ciba Foundation Symp. 33, 39–67, https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470720158
Mother rhesus monkey with her 
offspring. Photo by Laszlo Ilyes (2007), 
Flickr, https://www.flickr.com/photos/
laszlo-photo/495498455, CC BY 2.0.
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So long as a rule for changing a rule develops reliably in the individual, 
the outcome of Darwinian evolution is indifferent to how that came 
about. The outcome may have been arrived when certain environmental 
conditions were invariant and reaching adulthood successfully may 
depend on the maintenance of those conditions. 
Coordination in development 
If internal mechanisms have developed, by some means or another, 
to control later stages of behavioural ontogeny, a considerable degree 
of coordination is likely to exist between different mechanisms. For 
example, the rates of development of two patterns of behaviour may 
be independently influenced by interactions with the environment; 
it may be important that the development of one does not outrun the 
development of the other. Alternatively, the order in which behaviour 
patterns develop may be important; for example, exploration of the 
environment may be disastrous if it occurs before a young animal has 
established some standards of what is familiar. In such cases acquisition 
of information must precede performance. Once a motor pattern 
producing the appropriate feedback has been established, dependence 
on feedback can be reduced or even eliminated and the animal can 
accelerate the output rate. This is a bit like a musicians learning a new 
part. While they are able to monitor the individual sounds they are 
making to ensure their accuracy, they must allow enough time between 
notes. In the final performance when such control is no longer needed, 
the gaps between notes can be reduced.
The processes involved in plasticity can operate at many different 
levels, ranging from the molecular to the behavioural, some involving 
adaptability to what may be novel challenges and some responding 
conditionally to local circumstances. The results of development 
variation can be triggered in a variety of ways, some mediated through 
the parent’s characteristics. Sometimes variation arises because the 
environment triggers a developmental response that is appropriate 
to those ecological conditions. Sometimes the organism makes the 
best of a bad job in suboptimal conditions. Sometimes the buffering 
processes of development may not cope with what has been thrown at 
the organism, and a bizarre set of characteristics is generated. Whatever 
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the adaptedness of the characteristics, each of these effects demonstrate 
how a given genotype will express itself differently in different 
environmental conditions.
The contrasting properties of resistance to change and changeability 
— of elasticity and plasticity — are often found within the same material 
object. Stretch a metal spring a little and it will return to its former shape. 
Stretch it too far, however, and it will permanently take on a new shape. 
Adult humans, too, exhibit plasticity as well as elasticity in their values 
and personalities; they remain recognisably the same individual in a 
variety of situations, yet retain the capacity to change (see Chapter 4). 
Compare the robustness of most people in response to life’s buffetings 
with the way that some individuals profoundly modify their behaviour 
and attitudes. Continuity and change are not incompatible. The brains 
that generate behaviour do not consist of springs, of course, but the 
general property of getting back on track coexists with an ability to alter 
direction.
The implication of examples such as these is that when certain 
conditions have been satisfied, new mechanisms of control can be 
brought into operation. In self-modifying systems, for instance, the 
conditions necessary for progressing to the next stage of development 
could be the levelling-off of modification — in other words, the 
achievement of a steady state. This type of explanation would side-step 
an unprofitable debate about the precise chronology of developmental 
stages. It would focus attention on the environmental conditions and on 
the state of the individual associated with a transition from one stage of 
development to the next rather than on age as such.
Conclusions
The two points of view alluded to at the beginning of this chapter 
that have sometimes seemed incompatible can be made compatible. 
Far from being irreconcilable, the approaches of theorists interested 
in interactions and those interested in control mechanisms usefully 
complement each other. In brief, the development of behaviour often 
requires internal rules for its guidance, but reciprocity between the 
organism and its environment is also needed in order to give those rules 
greater flexibility and definition. 
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Plasticity in response to different environmental conditions may 
often usefully reside in those mechanisms that determine action by 
matching actual input values with preferred values. The main point is 
that if individuals have rules by which their behaviour is controlled, 
functional reciprocity between the developing individual and its 
environment can be usefully achieved by equipping the animal with 
rules for changing the rules. This feature of development has all the 
appearance of being well designed.

4. Discontinuities in Development1
Many aspects of body and behaviour change markedly during the 
course of development, sometimes quite suddenly. Discontinuous 
change is most obvious during the first two decades of a human life, for 
example at birth and puberty. Such discontinuities are not mysteries. 
Many physical and biological systems are capable of changing in an 
abrupt, discontinuous way. Steadily increasing the pressure on a light 
switch does not produce a steady increase in the brightness of the bulb 
it controls. The switch has a point of instability, so that one moment the 
bulb is dark and the next moment it is fully lit. Similarly, a relatively 
small internal or external change can quickly transform a developing 
organism’s characteristics to something that looks quite different. The 
fertilised egg of an animal rapidly divides becoming a ball of cells, the 
blastula. The cells continue to divide, but do so at slightly different rates. 
The steady change is such that the blastula suddenly seems to collapse 
on one side like a deflated rubber ball and a two-layered structure 
called the gastrula is formed. The embryo has changed its appearance 
dramatically as a result of a process of continuous growth.
Sudden changes in behaviour during an individual’s development 
may have biological utility, reflecting the changing ecology and needs 
of the individual as it gets older. The relatively abrupt alteration in the 
method of feeding at weaning, or in the mode of behaviour towards 
members of the opposite sex at puberty, are obvious enough. Becoming 
1  This chapter is drawn in part, with permission of Springer, from Bateson, P. (1978), 
How does behavior develop? In: P. Bateson & P.H. Klopfer (eds.), Perspectives in 
Ethology. Vol. 3: Social Behavior. New York: Springer, pp. 55–66. Some animal 
examples are given but the chapter focuses particularly on discontinuities in human 
development. 
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.04
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an adult involves a long process, and at each stage in development 
the individual must cope with challenges of the particular world in 
which it is living at the time. The caterpillar feeds voraciously and has 
adaptations for doing so, and by its camouflage, warning coloration 
or behaviour avoids as best it can the attentions of other animals that 
would eat it. Then its body goes through a dramatic change while a 
pupa and it emerges as a butterfly. Such metamorphoses have no exact 
parallel in humans but the requirements of living in a very different 
world from that of an adult are real. Are the apparent discontinuities 
seen in development related to the changes in function?
Monarch butterfly before and after metamorphosis. Monarch butterfly caterpillar. Photo 
by Antilived (2006), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Monarch_
catepillar.jpg, CC BY 3.0. Monarch butterfly. Photo by LyWashu (2008), Wikimedia,  
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Danaus_plexippus_01.jpg, CC BY 3.0.
In the behavioural literature, ‘discontinuity’ is used in several different 
senses. Strictly, it should refer to a sudden alteration in the characteristics 
of a system. So, for instance, when kittens suddenly start to take solid 
food in appreciable quantities, their rate of weight increase shows 
a marked rise since, before it happened, the mother was no longer 
able to provide sufficient milk to sustain the needs of her growing 
offspring.2 ‘Discontinuity’ is also used for the reorganization of rank 
on a given measure, so that when scores of attentiveness, vocalization, 
and sniffing in two-month-old human infants fail to predict their 
scores on the same measure at four months, a discontinuity is said to 
2  Martin, P. & Bateson, P. (2007), Measuring Behaviour. 3rd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
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have occurred. It is obvious that a discontinuity in the first sense of a 
change in organisation does not necessarily imply a discontinuity in 
the second sense of the rank ordering of individuals. The rank order 
of the kittens in terms of weight could remain unchanged with one 
kitten remaining the heaviest throughout development. In fact, the 
sudden change occurs at different ages in different litters, so the rank 
order may be altered, but only temporarily until some time after all the 
kittens have started to eat solid food.
Another type of evidence for discontinuities comes from longitudinal 
correlation studies in which the same pattern of behaviour is measured 
repeatedly in a group of subjects through development. Behaviour at one 
stage may successfully predict behaviour at the next and the next but not 
the one after that. So long as the rank order is dependent on new sources 
of variation or fluctuates randomly, extreme values tend to regress toward 
the mean. As a result, correlations between behaviour at one stage and 
behaviour at succeeding stages tend to diminish with the lapse of time. 
Even so, a particularly rapid reduction in the strength of a correlation 
requires additional explanation.
Associations between different measures side-step the problem of 
whether new behaviour patterns really are new. But it creates a fresh 
problem, which is whether the ‘old’ behaviour patterns really are the 
same when measured at later stages of development. The superficial 
descriptive similarities between different behaviour patterns may be 
deceptive. A mistake of this type might be especially likely when the 
measure in a standard test was something like ‘Latency to approach’ or 
‘Time near object’. Careful observation of the descriptive structure of the 
motor patterns might indicate that quite different systems of behaviour 
are involved at the different stages of development. For instance, when 
domestic chicks approach a novel visually conspicuous object, they may 
be responding socially at one day old but asocially exploring it when they 
are one week old. The character of the discontinuity can be investigated 
by examining not only the detailed form of the behaviour but also the 
consequences for the animal of its response before and after the change.
Changes in rank order need to be handled with particular care 
because the changes can usually be explained in a variety of ways, 
some of which are trivial. Positive correlations between a measure taken 
at one stage of development and those taken at others may evaporate 
for an uncomplicated reason, namely, that the measurements start to 
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clump together. This clumping might arise because the measurements 
reach some ceiling (or floor) on a scale of measurement. For instance, 
a correlation between the performances of children on a simple test of 
addition at one age and their performances on the same test at later ages 
might drop to zero because a point is reached when all the children get 
full marks. 
An absence of a correlation between two measures as determined 
by a straightforward statistical test need not necessarily mean that no 
relationship exists. A change from a linear to an inverted U-shaped 
relationship might easily be misinterpreted as a loss of any relationship. 
Consider a case in which IQ is repeatedly measured at different times 
in a group of children. Suppose that the test is one that is especially 
appropriate for a certain age range and contains questions like ‘Continue 
the series O,T,T,F,F…’ Bright children have no difficulty in providing 
the answer: ‘S,S,E…’ Bright adults rack their brains looking for complex 
rules that might provide some meaningful sequence and totally miss the 
point that the series consists of the first letters of One, Two, Three, Four, 
Five… Children who do well on an IQ test at one stage switch to a more 
adult-like problem-solving strategy before their peers and consequently 
perform relatively badly on what is for them an inappropriate test. So 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between cognitive ability at the two 
stages might easily arise. The change in the children’s strategy would 
be interesting but would not signify that a fundamental reordering of the 
children had occurred as a result of some event in development. Clearly, 
this possibility can be examined by plotting the data in graphical form. 
Furthermore, with appropriate measures of behaviour at later stages in 
development, it should be possible to show that the original rank order 
is eventually regained. 
In a cohort of individuals growing older together, their rank order on 
a particular measure at Stage 1 might correspond closely to their rank 
order at Stage 3. For instance, the factors responsible for the difference 
in their height at Stage 1 might be the same set of factors responsible for 
the difference in their height at Stage 3. A quite different set of factors 
might be responsible for the timing of a growth spurt. Consequently, 
the rank ordering of height at Stage 2 during the period of the growth 
spurt might be quite different from that of Stage 1 and Stage 3. Such an 
effect should be detectable from the data, provided of course that the 
cohort has been sampled at appropriate points during development.
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Changes in development take many forms, which invite different 
explanations. A qualitatively new pattern of behaviour may appear and 
an old one may disappear; switching from suckling to eating solid food 
during weaning is an example. An individual child’s consistent tendency 
to cry more than it laughs might change at a particular age. The rank-
order of individuals at one age often fails to predict the order at another 
age, so an infant who is, say, more attentive than others at two months 
may be less attentive than others at four months. Sometimes, the slow 
starter catches up and overtakes the more precocious child. Parents who 
are proud that their child is reading at the age of four should not assume 
that the child will turn out to be a genius. Faster development does not 
necessarily mean a superior outcome.
Loss of continuity
Continuity from one age to the next may be lost for many reasons. One 
is that development is affected by many influences, not all of which are 
the same for everybody. Another is that children are often profoundly 
influenced by the social situation in which they find themselves. 
Continuities across age may also be lost temporarily because different 
children pass through a particular transition at different chronological 
ages. People who are tall for their age when they are two years old are 
also highly likely to be tall when they are twenty. But they may not 
be tall for their age at thirteen, because individuals differ in the age at 
which they undergo the growth spurt before puberty. In this case, the 
property of being taller than peers survives the big changes occurring 
at puberty. The same is true for many distinctive aspects of behaviour 
and personality. When these change permanently, as undoubtedly they 
sometimes do, it may not be because the person has passed through one 
of the supposed metamorphoses of development.
A change in control of an unchanged motor pattern might occur at 
a certain stage in development. Three-week-old kittens with their eyes 
recently open approach the mother from a distance for suckling but 
when they reach her, they search for a nipple with their eyes closed.3 
3  Bateson, P. (2014), Behavioural development in the cat. In: Turner, D.C. & Bateson, 
P. (eds.), The Domestic Cat: The Biology of its Behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 11–26.
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Gradually, vision comes to trigger not only the approach to the mother 
but also the nipple-searching behaviour patterns that were formerly 
triggered by non-visual sensory systems. Such a change in control 
might easily be associated with a change in the rank order on the 
scale of measurement of the behaviour. In this case, the discontinuity 
can be investigated by an examination of the conditions that elicit the 
behaviour.
Every human individual 
must act many roles during 
his or her lifetime. Leaving 
aside the accuracy of how 
the roles are defined, how 
much of the individual’s 
personality and distinctive 
behavioural characteristics 
fails to survive the crossing 
of the boundary between 
one of the distinct ages 
and the next? A big change 
occurs in humans between 
the ages of two and four with the emergence of language and an 
awareness of self. Few adults remember much of what happened to them 
in their first few years. Even if they are subjectively certain that they 
remember their birth, the corroboration is invariably suspect or missing. 
It might be argued that in the first few years children have no memories; 
nothing has been stored so nothing has to be erased. Such a view is 
clearly false. Young children have good functional long-term memories. 
In one experiment, for example, children around two years of age were 
asked to imitate actions that they had seen eight months before. They 
performed significantly better than children who had not previously seen 
these actions.4 The absence of memories from infancy does not reflect an 
inability to form enduring memories at the time, suggesting instead that 
young children can remember things but that substantial reorganisation 
of memory occurs between the ages of two and four.
4  Strohl, K.P. & Thomas, A.J. (1997), Neonatal conditioning for adult respiratory 
behaviour. Respir. Physiol. 110.2–3, 269–275, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0034-5687(97) 
00092-3
Mother cat suckling her kittens. Photo by Ashim 71 
(2014), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Mother_Cat_with_her_Kittens.jpg, CC BY 4.0.
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Conclusions
The phenomena of discontinuities in development excite considerable 
interest because the changes may represent an alteration in the ecology 
of the developing individual. A variety of different explanations may 
be offered in any particular case. The phenomena are undoubtedly 
heterogeneous and so, while each explanation could apply some of the 
time, it is doubtful whether any one of them will apply all of the time. 
Some of the explanations point to deficiencies in method; some imply 
that after a loss of the original rank order on a particular measure, that 
order will be recovered, and some suggest that a change in rank order 
is permanent. The analogy with metamorphosis would be relevant only 
to phenomena brought about by the last group of processes. When 
behaviour at a given stage of development is matched to the ecological 
conditions in which the individual lives, the appearance of design is 
raised once again. 

5. Early Experience and 
Later Behaviour1
The conviction that experience can exert a greater influence at some times 
of life than at others is deeply rooted in conventional thinking about 
humans and other animals. The disturbing picture of a child missing the 
developmental bus by not being treated in a particular way at specific 
times has been strongly challenged.2 In many instances, it is possible to 
resolve the apparent contradiction between the view that the young are 
especially susceptible to particular experiences at particular times and 
the view that adults can also be affected by experience. This is because 
the effect of early experience involving influence or instruction from 
the environment can arise not so much through an incapacity to learn 
as through a reluctance to do so outside the period of sensitivity. When 
such reluctance can be overcome, it is possible for the older individual 
to learn about new things once again. It is important therefore to deal 
with the evidence for the effects of early experience separately from the 
mechanisms that control the timing of sensitive periods in development.
Many people who study the development of behaviour in humans 
feel uncomfortable, or even hostile, when evidence from animals is 
mentioned. It is as though the evidence is tainted with rigid determinism 
1  This chapter is drawn in part, with permission of Springer, from Bateson, P. 
(1983), The interpretation of sensitive periods. In: A. Oliverio & M. Zappella 
(eds.), The Behavior of Human Infants. New York: Plenum Press, pp. 57–70, https://
doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4613-3784-3. Much of this chapter is devoted to change and 
resistance to change in humans.
2  Clarke, A.M. & Clarke, A.D.B. (1976), Early Experience: Myth and Evidence. London: 
Open Books.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.05
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and with the worst excesses of biologists intent on taking over the 
social sciences. It is a great pity that such attitudes are so prevalent 
because the phenomena encompassed by the evidence can provide 
highly promising gateways to an understanding of developing mental 
processes. A ‘sensitive period’, or one of its synonyms, ought merely to 
refer descriptively to the evidence that an individual’s characteristics 
may be most strongly influenced by a given event at a certain stage of 
development. It is not an explanatory concept. It should not suggest 
that other events exert their maximum influence at the same stage. Nor 
should it carry implications about what might have given rise to the 
particular sensitive period that has been described.
In terms of an analogy with a moving train, the window of a particular 
compartment in the developmental train opens at a particular stage in 
the journey and then stays open. As a result of what an occupant learns 
about the outside world, it subsequently averts its gaze from anything 
strange. Because it can learn nothing until the window does open, 
the timing of the ending of the sensitive period is also dependent on 
the internal processes responsible for opening the window in the first 
place. If this analogy can be pressed a little further, it looks as though 
the occupant can, under certain circumstances, be persuaded to study 
strange things outside the train later in the journey, and when it does so 
it is influenced by what it sees. 
It is possible to reconcile the view that early experience is important 
with the view that nothing is irreversible. The general point is that it 
may be possible for the distinctive features of behaviour to be formed in 
a particular stage in development and yet for the processes generating 
those features to be reactivated at much later stages in the life-cycle. 
An understanding of the mechanisms can explain why, under certain 
circumstances, the evidence for sensitive periods seems to evaporate. 
Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytical theory, which was unusual at 
the time, reflected his belief that seemingly irreversible influences from 
childhood could be overcome in adults.3 This view was central to Freud’s 
method of therapy for those whose lives had been adversely affected 
by their early experience. Nowadays the idea is widely accepted and is 
implicit in the vast self-help industry, which is built on the supposition 
3  Freud, S. (1905), Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie. Leipzig: Franz Deuticke.
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The older, and perhaps excessive, emphasis on early experience may 
have been rejected because of its implied pessimism that once someone 
had missed the developmental 
train, nothing could be done to help 
them thereafter. The grounds for 
optimism are in fact considerable, 
and evidence for sensitive periods 
early in development may be 
readily reconciled with evidence for 
subsequent changes in behaviour. 
This is most clearly seen when the 
experience that could cause the 
change is not normally encountered 
in later life. An unwillingness to 
eat novel food means that people 
will not encounter the flavours and 
textures that might change their 
preferences. But it is not just a matter 
of preference. The mechanisms in 
the brain that protect behaviour 
from change can be stripped away so 
that plasticity is once again possible. 
The behaviour patterns that are typical of gender, such as the style 
of play in boys and girls, may be amplified or minimised as the result 
of social influences from peers, teachers and parents. In the same way 
that a boy can become less ‘boyish’ in social circumstances that reduce 
gender differences, some shy children become less shy as they develop. 
Equally, some outgoing children become more withdrawn. The evidence 
that birth order has a significant effect on personality points once again 
to the subtle role of experience in development. Other factors, such as 
sudden changes in a family’s economic circumstances, can also have big 
effects on what happens to a child.
that people can change themselves. Indeed, the pendulum has swung so 
far that it often seems as though people should be able to change their 
behaviour and personality as readily as they change their clothes.
Sigmund Freud. Photo by Max 
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Washing the brain
Academics are sometimes caricatured (not entirely unfairly) as 
accumulating more and more detailed knowledge about a subject on 
which their focus becomes ever narrower. In the image of Waddington’s 
epigenetic landscape (see Chapter 3), they have descended into an 
intellectual valley from which escape becomes increasingly difficult. 
They are stuck in their own silos of knowledge. Even so, some 
scholars manifestly do break out of these narrow confines. Indeed, a 
much admired feature of the wisest academics is their ability to make 
connections between different bodies of knowledge. Is such willingness 
to branch out equally true for their more deeply seated beliefs and 
attitudes, such as their political persuasion or their sociability? Most 
people would say ‘no’. Values are established in early life and, it is 
supposed, remain firmly fixed thereafter.
American public opinion which had been comfortable in this belief 
took a jolt in the Korean War. About a third of the 7,000 American 
prisoners of war collaborated with their Chinese and North Korean 
captors, and 21 refused to return to the USA when the war was over. 
These ‘conversions’ generated consternation in the USA and stimulated an 
intense examination of the techniques used by the captors of the prisoners 
of war. Many of the apparent conversions turned out to have been little 
more than the effects of prolonged deprivation of sleep or, in some cases, 
self-preserving attempts to secure better living conditions. The so-called 
brainwashing methods were neither subtle nor sophisticated. Even so, 
some of the prisoners who had been subjected to terror, physical hardship 
and intensive indoctrination did seem to have changed their values and 
political allegiances in a more fundamental way.
The origins of brainwashing lie much further back than the Korean 
War. Echoes can be found, for instance, in the Christian revivalist 
conversions in eighteenth-century America. During a religious crusade 
in Massachusetts in the 1730s, the theologian Jonathan Edwards 
discovered that he could make his ‘sinners’ break down and submit 
completely to his will. He achieved this by threatening them with hell 
and thereby inducing acute fear, apprehension and guilt. Edwards, like 
many other preachers before and after him, whipped up the emotions of 
his congregation to a fever-pitch of anger, fear, excitement and nervous 
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tension, before exposing them to the new ideas and beliefs he wanted 
them to absorb. To this day, live rattlesnakes are passed around some 
congregations in the southern parts of the USA; the fear they induce 
can impair judgement and make the candidates for conversion more 
suggestible. Once this state of mental plasticity has been created, the 
preacher starts to replace their existing patterns of thought. And 
constant fear is, of course, a hallmark of totalitarian regimes where 
dissenting individuals live under the unremitting threat of detention, 
torture or execution.
The British psychiatrist William Sargant, working in the middle of 
the twentieth century, was deeply interested in the mind-moulding 
techniques, and noticed the importance of high emotion in the process 
of religious conversion.4 He drew on a wide range of human experience, 
including that of military brainwashing. He extended his inquiry to the 
beneficial uses of stress in psychotherapy. In the Second World War 
Sargant tried to help soldiers suffering from battle fatigue. As part of 
the therapy, he and his colleagues would deliberately arouse strong 
emotions in their patients, about events that had no direct connection 
with the trauma they had experienced.
Sargant argued for the importance of the emotional reaction in 
therapy, whereby patients are made anxious, guilty and even angry 
by their therapist and, in consequence, become able to change their 
previous patterns of behaviour. Sargant’s method has something in 
common with the psychological therapeutic technique of ‘flooding’, in 
which someone suffering from a phobia is deliberately frightened in the 
presence of the object or situation towards which they are phobic — for 
instance, by placing a large spider onto the chest of the patient who 
is terrified of spiders.5 Contrary to what intuition might suggest, the 
patient’s phobia may sometimes be reduced.
It is common practice around the world for army recruits to be 
treated brutally in the early stages of their training. The individual is 
broken down through physical and mental pressure before being rebuilt 
4  Sargant, W. (1957), Battle for the Mind: A Physiology of Conversion and Brainwashing. 
London: Heinemann.
5  References to flooding in psychiatry are given in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Flooding_(psychology)
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in the form required by the military. The recruits are verbally abused, 
made to perform pointless menial tasks, and forced onto long marches 
carrying heavy equipment. By degrees their platoon becomes their 
family. Away from armies, other methods for inducing psychological 
plasticity include social isolation, fasting, lowering blood glucose with 
insulin, physical discomfort, chronic fatigue and the use of disturbing 
lighting and sound effects. 
The so-called Stockholm syndrome, also known as ‘terror bonding’ 
or ‘trauma bonding’, may be yet another instance of psychological 
plasticity induced by emotional trauma. The term takes its name from 
an incident in Stockholm in the 1970s, in which a woman who was taken 
hostage in a Stockholm bank following an unsuccessful robbery formed 
a strong and long-lasting emotional bond with her captor. She even 
remained faithful to him during his subsequent imprisonment. Her 
strange reaction was not unique. Many other victims of violent hostage-
taking have ended up siding with their captors against the authorities 
who were trying to rescue them. Being taken hostage is obviously a 
traumatic experience, and the hostage-takers may be equally frightened 
because their lives are on the line as well. In such circumstances, where 
hostage and captor are exposed to each other while both are emotionally 
highly aroused, a strong emotional bond may form, bizarrely uniting 
them against the world outside. As with the various military, political, 
religious and therapeutic techniques for changing the way adults think 
and behave, the crucial element is the combination of psychological 
stress and suggestion. 
Comparable cases in which trauma has induced behavioural 
plasticity have been observed in other species as well. Adult wild horses 
are commonly ‘broken’ by traumatising them whilst exposing them to 
humans. A traditional but brutal method involves near-strangulation 
with a rope; even the wildest of wild horses can be reduced to 
gentle submissiveness in as little as 15 minutes using this technique. 
Unsocialised adult dogs can similarly be induced to form strong 
attachments to humans by means of traumatic discipline. (The fact that 
these practices work does not make them desirable.) An anecdotal but 
nonetheless illuminating case concerned a remarkable change in an adult 
female Soay sheep, which was part of a small flock living in the grounds 
of the University Sub-Department of Animal Behaviour at Madingley, 
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near Cambridge. The Soay sheep were wild, avoiding human beings, 
and the female in question was no exception. Then, one spring, she had 
a particularly difficult time giving birth. It was eventually necessary for 
Sub-Department’s staff to assist, by catching the mother and pulling 
her lamb out. This was undoubtedly a traumatic experience for her. 
Ever afterwards, until she died, this sheep remained strongly attached 
to humans and would follow people around as they moved about the 
grounds of the laboratory. The trauma of the birth, combined with 
simultaneous exposure to people, brought about a profound and long-
lasting change in this animal’s behaviour.
Neurobiology
The concept of extreme fear or emotional arousal inducing plasticity 
helps make sense of many diverse examples of behavioural change. 
What might be the neurobiological mechanisms underlying this effect? 
How does trauma make someone susceptible to fundamental changes 
in their thoughts and values? What might be the biological link between 
psychological stress and the processes of plasticity and change in the 
nervous system?
High levels of psychological stress are associated, amongst other 
things, with the rapid synthesis and turnover of the neurotransmitter 
substance noradrenaline. This chemical messenger of the nervous 
system has been implicated as an enabling factor in making the adult 
brain become plastic again. Noradrenaline (known in the USA as 
norepinephrine) is released in the mammalian brain, at the endings 
of neurons throughout the body, and from the adrenal glands just 
above the kidneys. It is released, amongst other things, in response to 
psychological stress; in humans, a mildly stressful situation such as 
giving a public speech will typically elicit a 50% rise in the amount of 
noradrenaline circulating in the bloodstream.
An experiment on the visual system of cats gave some valuable 
insights into the connection between noradrenaline and plasticity.6 
The mammalian visual system is normally changeable only during an 
6  Pettigrew, J.D. & Kasamutsu, T. (1978), Local perfusion of nor adrenaline maintains 
visual cortical plasticity. Nature 271: 761–763, https://doi.org/10.1038/271761a0
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early stage in the individual’s life. The capacity of an eye to stimulate 
neurons in the visual cortex of the cat’s brain depends on whether that 
eye received visual input between about one month and three months 
after birth. If one eye is deprived of visual stimuli during this period it 
virtually loses its capacity to excite cortical neurons thereafter, no matter 
how much visual stimulation it receives. The eye consequently becomes 
functionally blind, even though it remains physically unimpaired. Once 
the dominance of the other eye is established, it is exceedingly difficult to 
change the relationship with the unused eye. Similarly, binocular vision 
cannot easily be disrupted in normally reared individuals once it has 
become established. Infusing noradrenaline into one hemisphere of the 
visual cortex of older cats can re-establish plasticity and enable further 
change to occur in response to 
visual experience. If normally-
reared animals are deprived of the 
use of one eye during the period of 
noradrenaline infusion, binocular 
control of the neurons is lost in the 
visual cortex of the hemisphere 
that was infused. No such change 
occurs in the visual cortex of the 
other hemisphere. In other words 
noradrenaline can reverse in 
adulthood what would otherwise 
be unchangeable.7
7  Baroncelli, L. et al. (2016), Experience affects critical period plasticity in the visual 
cortex through an epigenetic regulation of histone post-translational modifications. 
J. Neurosci. https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1787-15.2016
If one eye is occluded in early life by, say, 
infection, the other eye becomes dominant 
for the rest of the cat’s life. Photo by Patrick 
Bateson, CC BY 4.0.
Continuity and change
The variety and complexity of behaviour and its underlying 
psychological systems inevitably means that any sweeping statement 
about the possibility of change must eventually come unstuck. The 
self-help industries that promise relief from shyness, depression, sloth, 
obesity, or addiction to nicotine deliver results only some of the time. 
Once developed, some patterns of behaviour are strongly buffered 
against subsequent change. Preference for certain types of food and 
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for particular places tend not to change. They may be stable for good 
reasons, since change can be disruptive and costly. On the other hand, 
not to change may, in certain circumstances, carry an even bigger cost, 
which perhaps explains why behavioural characteristics tend to become 
plastic under conditions of stress.
When one aspect of behaviour changes it does not imply that 
everything else must change as well. But whatever the complexities of 
development and the inadequacies of current understanding, it is clear 
that adults really are capable of changing — more so, perhaps, than 
many suppose. 
The psychiatric evidence for rehabilitation leaves untouched the 
question of which forms of behaviour, once developed, are most strongly 
buffered against subsequent change. It seems likely that in adults 
cognitive processes are more easily changed than those underlying their 
emotions.8 Adaptations that protect certain well-developed preferences 
and habits from alteration are to be expected. Fear of novelty, though 
general in its effects, would serve precisely this function.
Conclusions
A positive point that emerges is that evidence for sensitive periods in 
development can be readily reconciled with evidence for subsequent 
changes in behaviour. This is most clearly the case when the form of 
treatment involves experiences that would not normally be encountered 
in later life. Once the mechanisms protecting behaviour from change are 
stripped away by suitable treatment, change resulting from renewed 
plasticity is once again possible. Any changes in sensitivity that are found 
imply no particular mechanism. The search for what might generate a 
sensitive period in development is a separate enterprise. Even so, the 
stability of some aspects of behaviour, once formed, can be changed under 
certain conditions such as chronic stress. The flexibility make good sense 
in biological terms since it enables the individual to cope in a changed 
environment. The capacity has the appearance of good design.
8  This conclusion is supported by the work on Cognitive Behavioural Therapy 
which is used to treat a number of psychiatric disorders (e.g. McKay D. et al. 
(2015), Efficacy of cognitive-behavioral therapy for obsessive-compulsive disorder. 
Psychiatry Research 225.3, 236–246, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres.2014.11.058). 

6. Communication between 
Parents and Offspring1
How offspring respond to the behaviour of their parents raises important 
issues about their development. In studies of animal communication 
it has sometimes been argued that all the activities directed by one 
individual towards another are manipulative.2 Sometimes this view 
is clearly correct. Its most obvious form is in the interactions between 
species when one species manages to control the behaviour of another 
as if it were a puppet. A striking example is the European cuckoo. The 
mother cuckoo lays each egg in the nest of another species such as 
the reed warbler. The egg very closely resembles the egg of the host. 
The young cuckoo hatches before the reed warblers’ chicks and ejects 
the competition from the nest. Then the young cuckoo successfully 
persuades the unfortunate warbler foster parents to feed it, even when 
it is twice their size. By looking like a super-offspring, the cuckoo 
successfully exploits the normal pattern of interaction that exists 
between parent and young. 
The essentially competitive process of Darwinian evolution does 
not necessarily imply a competitive outcome. On the contrary, a great 
deal of communication involves signals that carry real information and 
cooperation in which all the participants benefit by working with each 
1  Part of this chapter is taken, with permission, from Bateson, P. (1990), Animal 
communication. In: Ways of Communicating, ed. by D.H. Mellor. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 35–55.
2  Dawkins, R. & Krebs, J.R. (1979), Arms races between and within species. Proc. R. 
Soc. Lond B 205.1161, 489–511, https://doi.org/10.1098/rspb.1979.0081
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.06
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In co-operating animals of 
the same species, the mutual 
benefits of working together 
can be greatly enhanced if 
information about the state of 
the external world is transmitted 
from one individual to another. 
One of the most extraordinary 
and well-analysed examples 
of such transmission is the 
so-called dance language of 
honey bees.3 The characteristics 
of the waggle dance performed in the hive provide crucial information 
about where the returning bee successfully foraged. The duration of the 
dance circuit is strongly correlated with the distance from the hive to the 
food. In a darkened hive the angle of orientation of the central segment 
3  Munz, T. (2016), The Dancing Bees: Karl von Frish and the Discovery of Honeybee 
Language. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/ 
9780226021058.001.0001. A video of the honey bees’ waggle dance is available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7ijI-g4jHg
other. One explanation for cooperation is that, at least in the past, the 
aided individuals were relatives; cooperation is like parental care and 
has evolved for similar reasons. Another is that co-operating individuals 
jointly benefited even though they were not related; the co-operative 
behaviour has evolved because those who engage in it were more likely 
to survive as individuals and reproduce than those that did not. Once 
again the force of this particular argument can be seen most clearly in 
communication between different species.
Some small fish, which are conspicuously marked but highly suitable 
as a morsel of food, clean the teeth of big predator fish. Before they do 
their job, the cleaner fish perform a characteristic waggling swim in front 
of the monster. This inhibits the normal feeding response and the great 
predator opens its mouth, allowing the little fish in. When the big fish 
needs to eat other little fish, it signals it is switching back into normal 
hunting mode by jerking its jaw in a particular way. The little cleaner 
fish scuttle for cover and the 
mutually beneficial symbiotic 
arrangement is preserved.
Small cleaner fish servicing a big predator 
fish. Photo by Richard Ling (2005), Wikimedia, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/
File:Epinephelus_tukula_is_cleaned_by_two_
Labroides_dimidiatus.jpg, CC BY-SA 2.0.
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of the dance with respect to the vertical is related to the angle between 
the food source and the sun’s position.
The most interesting test-bed of evolutionary thinking about 
communication is provided by those situations in which individuals 
compete with each other over resources. Advocates of the manipulation 
view urge that a trustworthy mode of communication is always open 
to cheating in which the cheater exploits information provided by its 
opponent and gives nothing away about itself. As a consequence, it is 
much more likely to win the resource and likely to reproduce faster. 
Before long, it is argued, cheating will have evolved to become the 
dominant mode of behaviour.
This argument sounds convincing, but most people who know a 
particular species well quickly develop a good intuitive sense of whether 
an animal is likely to attack or escape by observing its body and facial 
postures. After the initial location of the opponent, several levels of 
escalation may precede an actual fight, involving easily recognised and 
increasingly energetic displays. Neither party will benefit from getting 
hurt and, in the majority of cases, the disputes are settled without 
serious damage on either side. The encounter can break off at any stage 
during the process of escalation. The contests are usually won by the 
larger individual, but if the opponents are of equal size, they are usually 
won by the holder of the resource. The behaviour of each individual at 
each stage of escalation indicates how serious it is about continuing.
From a large number of quantitative studies, it is clear that escape is 
well predicted by certain patterns of behaviour. If one animal suddenly 
turns tail, it is liable to be attacked and might get injured. The advantage 
to the loser of not being misunderstood and expressing the animal 
equivalent of a white flag is obvious. The benefit to the winner from 
responding appropriately to such a signal is that it does not risk injury 
by escalating the conflict into a real fight unnecessarily. The argument 
is, therefore, that a form of behaviour which effectively negotiates the 
end of a conflict can be evolutionarily stable.
While most biologists placed great emphasis on dissimulation, one 
took a very different line. The Israeli biologist Amotz Zahavi argued 
that signalling that carried a handicap to the signaller was honest.4 
4  Zahavi, A. & Zahavi, A. (1997), The Handicap Principle: A Missing Piece of Darwin’s 
Puzzle. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Zahavi was treated as an eccentric since the initial attempts to model 
his ideas about handicaps failed formally to substantiate them. More 
recently, theoreticians have been able to satisfy nearly everybody 
else that if a signal carries a cost, it may also be reliable in the sense 
of carrying accurate information.5 Honest signalling is now widely 
accepted, although arguments continue about whether honest signals 
must carry some cost. 
A crucial question is where the balance is struck between signalling 
real information about internal state and signalling misinformation. 
Consider analogies with the human game of poker. On the one hand, 
if players can get away with bluff, they will make money. On the other, 
if players bluff against opponents who have really good hands, they 
may end up very much worse off than if they had decided to throw 
in their bad hand before they had raised the bet too far. So something 
equivalent to negotiation might be expected. For each individual the 
optimal outcome of such negotiation should represent a balance between 
the costs of escalating the conflict to likely damage to the pocket (or in 
case of fights, the body) and the benefits of winning the resource easily. 
An individual that escalates 
without assessment is in danger 
of finding itself in a fight with a 
much stronger opponent.
5  Grafen, A. (1990), Biological signals as handicaps. J. theor. Biol. 144.4, 517–546, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-5193(05)80088-8
Evolutionary pressure is 
present for some exaggeration of 
fighting ability and many species 
puff themselves up in various 
ways, making themselves look 
more fearsome than they really 
are. Even so, honest advertisement 
of strength, providing cues that 
cannot be faked, may count most 
in the long run. One example 
may be the male red deer, which competes vigorously with other males 
for opportunities to mate. Fights occur, of course, but conflicts are most 
often settled by bouts of roaring at each other. 
Red deer stag roaring at competitors in 
rutting season. Photo by Bill Ebbesen (2009), 
Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Red_deer_2009.jpg, CC BY 3.0.
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The roaring is extremely exhausting for the animals and the one 
that can keep it up for longest is also likely to be the stronger. In the 
roaring contests, both individuals increase the rate of roaring until one 
seems to recognise it is outclassed and retreats. Recordings of red deer 
roars were played to a real stag.6 Unlike the stag, the tape-recorder did 
not get tired and when the tape-recorder roared at a high rate, the stag 
roared less. It seems as though the stag has been forced into accepting 
that it was dealing with a much more powerful opponent. While fake 
characteristics may gain short-term successes, those individuals that 
ignore such cues and focus on reliable sources of evidence about their 
opponents may eventually do better in the course of evolution.
Parents and offspring
Evolutionary theories about parent-offspring relationships have 
undergone a similar transformation to those about communication. 
The prediction used to be that young will demand food and care 
from their parents at weaning whereas the parents’ interests are best 
served by reserving their efforts for future offspring. The American 
biologist Robert Trivers revolutionised the study of parent-offspring 
relationships when he pointed out that the long-term interests of the 
parent are not identical with those of its offspring.7 A parent may 
increase its reproductive success by weaning its young earlier than is 
best for them, because it saves itself from becoming exhausted and is 
thus able to have a larger number of offspring than would otherwise 
have been the case. As a consequence, aggression between parents and 
offspring is to be expected, particularly at the time of weaning, and the 
communication between them was not thought to be reliable.
Trivers’s stimulating contribution has been responsible for a large 
theoretical literature. The insights derived from evolutionary theory 
have been questioned partly because of changes in theoretical stance 
about the benefits of reliable signals. More seriously, perhaps, the 
6  Clutton-Brock, T.H. & Albon, S.D. (1979), The roaring of red deer and the 
evolution of honest advertisement. Behaviour 69.3, 135–144, https://doi.org/ 
10.1163/156853979x00449. A video of a male deer’s roaring is available at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=76pRLpwumjc
7  Trivers, R.L. (1985), Social Evolution. Menlo Park, CA: The Benjamin/Cummings 
Publishing Company.
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evolutionary argument had led to an unjustified expectation that 
conflict of evolutionary interest necessarily implies behavioural conflict. 
Behavioural aggression between parent and offspring should be referred 
to as ‘squabbling’, thus avoiding the ambiguous use of ‘conflict’. Even 
so, the behavioural evidence does not fit the theory especially well.
Two-year-old tantrums in humans have been interpreted in precisely 
the opposite sense to the theory of conflicts. When they occur, tantrums 
seem to be concerned with the difficult process of establishing some 
autonomy from the parent. Well-attached children with sensitive 
mothers do not seem to have tantrums, using their parents as a secure 
base from which to explore the world. Rhesus monkey mothers may 
actively reject their offspring around the time of weaning, while their 
offspring play an increasingly prominent role in initiating contact with 
their mother as they grow older.8 Squabbles did not arise in this species 
as a result of mothers’ reduction in suckling when they conceived their 
next offspring. Nor did mothers that failed to conceive have more 
demanding infants, as would have been predicted from the theory of 
parent-offspring conflict. 
Occasionally, weaning squabbles between mother and young do 
occur, particularly if the mother is already pregnant again. In field 
studies of baboons, conflicts of interest did not invariably lead to such 
squabbles. Evidence from a variety of mammals suggests that maternal 
aggression often does not occur at all and, if it does, it is seen at quite 
different stages in development from that in which the process of 
weaning occurs.9
Perhaps the most convincing evidence against the early manipulative 
predictions derived from parent-offspring conflict theory was that 
mothers both monitor and respond to the progress of their current 
offspring. Mothers may actively compensate for the slow development 
of their young or delay conception of the subsequent offspring if the 
present one is progressing slowly. Rat mothers continue to lactate for 
longer than would otherwise have been the case when they are given 
8  Gomendio, M. (1991), Parent/offspring conflict and maternal investment in 
rhesus macaques. Anim. Behav. 42.6, 993–1005, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0003- 
3472(05)80152-6
9  Bateson, P. (1994), The dynamics of parent-offspring relationships in mammals. 
Trends Ecol. Evol. 9.10, 399–403, https://doi.org/10.1016/0169-5347(94)90066-3
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pups younger than the ones they had been suckling, again suggesting 
that the mother is not necessarily driving the weaning process without 
regard for her offspring’s condition. 
From the offspring’s standpoint, young laboratory rats seem to wean 
themselves spontaneously; a stage is reached in development when they 
actively choose solid food in preference to milk. When the offspring’s 
metabolic costs go up as they get older and larger, they may be forced to 
wean themselves because they simply do not get enough energy from 
their mother’s milk. In domestic cats, the rate of growth starts to slow 
down around 20 days after birth, particularly in kittens of nutritionally 
stressed mothers, and then suddenly speeds up again around 30 days 
as they start to process solid food efficiently. The discontinuity occurs at 
different ages in different animals and is less apparent, as a consequence 
in averaged data. The slowing down of growth before the discontinuity 
is much more pronounced in larger litters that impose greater energetic 
demands on their mothers. The eventual inadequacy of the mother to 
provide for all the nutritional needs of the young is particularly evident 
in fur seals in which the mother disappears for several days while she 
stokes up for the next bout of lactation. Eventually what she can provide 
is less than what her pup needs.10
The empirical study of behaviour has forced a reappraisal of the 
optimal route to maximum reproductive success in mothers and the 
optimal route to highest probability of survival in their offspring. The 
evolutionary arguments needed to be looked at again, not simply from 
the standpoint of honest signalling but also bearing in mind how an 
individual’s state might affect the optimal weaning time from both the 
standpoint of the mother and that of her offspring.11 In species that can 
breed more than once, the mother has a reasonable chance of successfully 
raising more than one offspring. The current offspring will only survive 
to independence after a certain minimum amount of care has been given 
to it. Even when the mother is well fed, the longer she cares for the 
current offspring, the worse her state may become, given the substantial 
energy costs of lactation. As a consequence, the costs in terms of the 
10  Bateson, P. (1994), The dynamics of parent-offspring relationships in mammals. 
Trends Ecol. Evol. 9.10, 399–403, https://doi.org/10.1016/0169-5347(94)90066-3
11  Ibid.
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diminished probability of rearing more young may soon outweigh the 
marginal benefits of giving more milk to the current young.
The probability of having another offspring ought to influence the 
time and energy devoted to the current one. For example, the mother 
may have to face a winter in which she cannot breed and which she 
might not survive. Furthermore, matters may be made worse if finding 
a mate takes time. With a relatively low probability of breeding again, 
her lifetime reproductive success may be maximised if she gives higher 
priority to the current offspring than to those that are as yet unborn. 
Conversely, if she has mated immediately after the birth of the current 
young and is pregnant while she lactates, as is possible in species such 
as the cat and the rat, she may give lower priority to the offspring she 
is currently looking after than if she were not pregnant. Under most 
environmental conditions, the optimum weaning time should be earlier 
than for non-pregnant mothers. 
The reactions of an offspring to its mother’s conditional responses 
to the environment should also be conditional. In many species, 
the relation between the effect of its behaviour on its probability of 
surviving before weaning and its probability of surviving after weaning 
must both be taken into account. This is because offspring survival does 
not simply depend on getting as much milk as possible from the mother 
while she is able to provide it. Other benefits, such as the protection 
the offspring might have derived from her in the post-weaning period, 
would be lost if it were so demanding in the pre-weaning period that 
it seriously damaged her health. In the early stages of lactation the 
offspring’s survival depends utterly on receiving immediate maternal 
attention. Moreover, since meeting its needs is relatively easy for the 
mother because of the offspring’s low body mass compared to that of the 
mother, the longer-term consequences for post-weaning care of being 
demanding are not heavy. As the offspring grows, these delayed effects 
of being demanding start to rise and, at the same time, the chances of the 
young surviving without maternal milk begin to improve. By the time 
the offspring has reached the late pre-weaning stage, its peak demands 
have dropped to low values.
The optimal weaning ages for offspring depend greatly on how 
much care is given after weaning. If little is characteristically given by 
the species, optimal demand by the offspring remains high until the 
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demands of switching to primarily solid food become paramount. The 
greater the amount of post-weaning care the mother gives, the earlier 
the age relative to weaning when her offspring’s demanding behaviour 
should start to decline. The general point is that an offspring benefits 
from reducing its demanding behaviour as it gets older and also benefits 
from monitoring maternal availability which is a measure of her state.
Each mother is sensitive to the condition of her offspring so that, if 
it is still in need of care but reasonably well developed, she may forego 
a breeding opportunity in order to nurture it through to independence. 
Young are sensitive to the condition of their mothers and adjust their 
pattern of development accordingly, since their mothers respond not 
only to the state of the young but also to their own condition. 
The offspring may also need to prepare for the probable world in 
which they have to grow up. Members of the same species, the same 
sex and the same age sometimes differ dramatically from one another. 
‘Alternative tactics’ within a species commonly arise because an 
individual has the capacity to respond in more than one way according 
to environmental conditions or its own body state. Such conditional 
responses during development are well known in the social insects, 
in which one sister might be adapted for producing thousand of eggs, 
another has massive jaws used in defence of the nest and another is 
equipped with foraging skills never expressed by the other two. Similar 
environmentally-induced differences occur frequently in mammals. 
Young mammals may pick up crucial information from their mothers 
about when to wean themselves and how to develop later on the basis 
of cues that they pick up from their nursing mothers. 
The process of weaning in mammals is not readily explained in 
terms of conflicts of interest that inevitably lead to squabbling. From 
a behavioural standpoint, the interplay between parent and offspring 
is dynamic. The mother has to balance the maintenance of her body 
condition, easily debilitated by energetically costly lactation, against 
responding sensitively to the needs of current offspring. If the current 
offspring lag behind in development, the mother may increase her 
reproductive success by extending her parental care. 
For its part, each offspring balances demanding maximum resources 
and attention from its mother up to the last moment she is prepared to 
feed it against being sensitive to its mother’s state. The young have to 
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pay attention to the condition of the mother because of the need to take 
into account both the immediate effects of maternal care on survival but 
also the post-weaning contributions of the mother. Moreover, to adopt 
characteristics that will be appropriate to the environment into which 
they will have fend for themselves, the young may need to respond 
to information provided by the mother. The mother and her offspring 
are unlikely to have perfect knowledge of each other either initially or 
during development. Therefore each needs to monitor its own and the 
other’s often rapidly changing state.
Conclusions
Communication is not simply about manipulating another individual. 
The emerging picture is more nuanced than that. Sensitivity to the 
condition of the receiver of the signal is often adaptive to the sender. So 
the sender benefits in Darwinian terms and the competitive evolutionary 
process produces behaviour that is apparently more cooperative than has 
sometimes been supposed. In short, the mother-offspring relationship is 
a system that is apparently well-designed for both parties. 
7. Avoiding Inbreeding and Incest1
Finding a compatible partner is an important part of reproductive 
behaviour in many animals in which mates are chosen carefully. 
Members of different species do not make good mates. At the other pole, 
too much inbreeding can also reduce reproductive success.
Inbred animals are more likely carry some damaging genes. Most 
potentially harmful genes are recessive and are therefore harmless 
when they are paired with a dissimilar gene become damaging in their 
effects when combined with an identical gene. They are more likely to 
be paired with an identical recessive gene as a result of inbreeding. The 
genetic costs of inbreeding arising from the expression of damaging 
recessive genes are the ones that people usually worry about.2 Recessive 
genes are less of a problem in mammals than they are in birds because 
mammals generally move around less and they may live in quite highly 
inbred groups where the harmful alleles have been purged. The most 
important biological cost of excessive inbreeding is that it negates the 
1  This chapter is drawn, with permission, from: Bateson, P. (1983), Optimal 
outbreeding. In: P. Bateson (ed.), Mate Choice. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 257–277.
2  Across Asia, the effects of genetic disorders are becoming increasingly obvious. This 
change is especially important among the children of couples who have married 
cousins and is also found in migrant communities resident in North America, 
Western Europe and Australasia who continue the tradition of close kin marriages 
(Bittles, A.H. (2003), Consanguineous marriage and childhood health. Developmental 
Medicine 45.8, 571–576, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8749.2003.tb00959.x). The 
unfortunate consequence arises from practicing first cousin marriages generation 
after generation. In relatively inbred animal populations the preferred genetic 
distance between mates may be greater than in more outbred populations thereby 
offsetting the effects of mating with close kin (see Bateson, P. (1983), Mate Choice).
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.07
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benefits of the genetic variation generated by sexual reproduction. If an 
animal inbreeds too much, it might as well make copies of itself without 
the effort and trouble of courtship and mating. 
On the other side, excessive outbreeding also has costs. For a start, 
excessive outbreeding disrupts the relation between parts of the body 
that need to be well adapted to each other. The point is illustrated by 
human teeth and jaws. The size and shape of teeth are strongly inherited 
characteristics. So too are jaw size and shape, as may be seen in many 
paintings of the Hapsburg family, scattered in the museums around the 
world. The Dürer painting of the Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I 
reveals the large Hapsburg jaw, which was even more pronounced in 
his highly inbred great-great-great-grandson, Philip IV of Spain, shown 
in the painting by Velasquez. The potential problem arising from too 
much outbreeding is that the inheritance of teeth and jaw sizes are 
not correlated. A woman with small jaws and small teeth who had a 
child by a man with big jaws and big teeth lays down trouble for her 
grandchildren, some of whom may inherit small jaws and big teeth. In a 
world without dentists, ill-fitting teeth were probably a serious cause of 
mortality. This example of mismatching, which is one of many that may 
arise in the complex integration of the body, simply illustrates the more 
general cost of too much outbreeding.
Two members of the Hapsburg family separated by five generations. Albrecht Dürer, 
Portrait of Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor (1519), Kunsthistorisches Museum, 
Vienna. Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Albrecht_Dürer_-_
Portrait_of_Maximilian_I_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg, Public Domain. Diego Velázquez, 
Portrait of Philip IV (1656), National Gallery, London. Wikimedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Philip_IV_of_Spain.jpg, Public Domain.
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In animals direct evidence for 
the genetic costs of outbreeding is 
still relatively slender, although the 
examples are starting to multiply. 
Some of the studies of humans 
suggest that fecundity is related to 
the similarity between spouses. For 
example, in one study the more alike 
human couples were on 17 out of 19 
measures of the body (such as forearm 
length, height and ear length), the 
more children they had. Although 
most correlations were positive, each 
With costs accruing to both inbreeding and outbreeding, Darwinian 
evolution is presumed to have operated on mechanisms involved in 
mate choice to minimise both. The outcome of Darwinian evolution is a 
preference for a mate that is not too closely related and not too distantly 
related.3 Hybrid vigour is so dramatic when it occurs that it seems to 
argue against the view that marginal outbreeding is beneficial. Such 
hybrids are usually infertile and the original parents will have few or no 
grand-offspring. This means that tests of outbreeding depression should 
be made in the natural environment where the benefits of co-adapted 
gene complexes can be revealed. 
In experiments with the mountain delphinium the largest number of 
seedlings was produced by crosses between plants that were ten metres 
apart. Plants that were self pollinated 
and those that were crossed with 
plants 1000 metres away, both gave 
rise to significantly smaller numbers 
of seedlings.4
3  The idea of balance between inbreeding and outbreeding was first suggested by 
Wright, S. (1933), The roles of mutations, inbreeding, crossbreeding and selection 
in evolution. Proc. VIth Internat. Congr. Genetics 1, 356–366, available at http://www.
esp.org/books/6th-congress/facsimile/contents/6th-cong-p356-wright.pdf
4  Price, M.V. & Waser, N.M. (1979), Pollen dispersal and optimal outcrossing in 
Delphinium nelsonii. Nature, 277.5694, 294–297. Independently of the use of ‘optimal 
outbreeeding’ (see Bateson, P. (1978), Sexual imprinting and optimal outbreeding. 
Nature, 273.5664, 659–660, https://doi.org/10.1038/273659a0) they used the term 
‘optimal outcrossing’.
This delphinium produces most seeds 
when crossed with plants 10 metres 
away from it. Delphinium nuttallianum. 
Photo by Walter Siegmund (2009), 
Wikipedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Delphinium_
nuttallianum_9179.JPG, CC BY 3.0.
70 Behaviour, Development and Evolution
correlation coefficient was low and could, of course, be explained by 
shared associations between the measures and a third variable such as 
social class. In a study of Icelandic partners, those who were distant 
cousins had more grandchildren than those who were more closely 
or more distantly related. The best outcome in terms of biological 
adaptiveness is to have the most grandchildren when other things such 
as social status are equal.5 
Not all the costs of outbreeding too much are genetic in character. 
If and when they operate, these non-genetic costs further complicate 
the interpretation of laboratory breeding experiments aimed at settling 
whether or not outbreeding can be costly. For instance, two unrelated 
individuals in the laboratory may produce many offspring and, because 
they share adjoining cages and therefore common antibodies, they incur 
no cost from being exposed to pathogens carried by the other. It could 
be a different story in the natural environment. Similarly, the advantage 
of using skills acquired for dealing with the local environment could 
counteract the genetic advantage of moving into another area prior 
to breeding. Yet the non-genetic advantage could not be assessed in a 
laboratory experiment. Nor could the various costs when moving away 
from the natal area such as increased risks from predation. Some caution 
is needed before jumping to conclusions about just where the balance 
between inbreeding and outbreeding is likely to be struck.
If an animal does best by choosing a mate that is neither a close 
relative nor totally unrelated to it, what mechanisms could it use? Of 
the various types of explanation that have been offered, two are likely 
to be important. The first proposes that prior to mating, members of 
one sex move away from the area where they were hatched or born.6 
Providing they do not move too far, their mates are likely to bear some 
genetic relationship to themselves and so optimal outbreeding could be 
achieved. The second possibility is that animals are able to recognise 
close kin and, on the assumption that physical appearance is a measure 
of genotypic similarity, choosing a mate that looks, sounds or smells a 
5  Helgasson, A. et al. (2008), An association between the kinship and fertility of 
human couples. Science 319.5864, 813–816, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1150232
6  Greenwood, P.J. (1980), Mating systems, philopatry and dispersal in birds 
and mammals. Anim. Behav. 28.4, 1140–1162, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0003- 
3472(80)80103-5
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bit different but not too different from close kin will result in optimal 
outbreeding. These two explanations are not mutually exclusive. Some 
species could employ both mechanisms. The evidence suggests that 
both are found in the animal kingdom.
First, in many species of bird and mammal one sex moves out of 
the natal area prior to breeding. In most species of birds, females move 
away although exceptions exist such as the snow goose in which the 
male is unlikely to return to the natal area. In most species of mammal 
the males are more likely to move away but here again exceptions are 
known such as the chimpanzee in which the females move away from 
their natal group. The costs of travel can be quite considerable and 
usually the distance travelled by the sex that moves is not great. The net 
effect of restricted movements in one direction and returns by offspring 
in the next generation could be an overall population that was quite 
highly inbred. An important question remains whether such a system 
would be sufficiently finely tuned to preserve the optimal balance 
between inbreeding and outbreeding. 
Recognition of kin, the other suggested mechanism for optimal 
outbreeding, could be accomplished in one or two ways. One possibility 
is that the genes that influence an animal’s external appearance also 
directly influence its ability to recognise another animal very much like 
itself without the involvement of any learning process. More plausibly, 
the animal learns the characteristics of close kin, or failing that of itself, 
and can then recognise novel individuals that are similar to kin. In 
Japanese quail a first-cousin is preferred by both sexes over siblings and 
also over unrelated birds.7 
Natural experiments have been performed unwittingly on humans. 
The most comprehensive evidence has come from the marriage statistics 
from Taiwan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when 
Taiwan was under Japanese control. The Japanese kept detailed records 
for the births, marriages and deaths of everyone on the island. As in 
many other parts of South East Asia, marriages were arranged, and they 
occurred mainly and most interestingly in two forms. The ‘major’ type of 
marriage was the conventional one in which the partners first met each 
other when adolescent. In the ‘minor’ type of marriage, the wife-to-be 
7  Bateson, P. (1982), Preferences for cousins in Japanese quail. Nature 295.5846, 236–
237, https://doi.org/10.1038/295236a0
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was adopted as a young girl into the family of her future husband. In 
minor-type marriages, therefore, the partners grew up together like 
siblings. Later in life their sexual interest in their partner was assessed in 
terms of divorce, marital fidelity and the number of children produced. 
By all these measures, the minor marriages were conspicuously less 
successful than the major marriages.8 Typically, the young couples who 
had grown up together from an early age, like brother and sister, were 
not much interested in each other sexually when the time came for their 
marriage to be consummated. Girls who were adopted into families 
before the age of three and then married their adopted ‘brother’ had a 
lower fertility than girls adopted later.
In the past Israeli kibbutzniks who grew up together like siblings 
rarely married each other. The few who chose to marry within their peer 
group were usually those who had entered the kibbutz after the age of 
six and therefore had not grown up with their future spouses. 
Early experience and sexual attraction
Neither of the evidence from Taiwan or Israel means that the learning 
process that affects adult sexual preferences is completed early in life. 
If children grow up together and consequently see a lot of each other, 
they revise the ways in which they recognise each other; this goes on 
until they are sexually mature. By the time they are three, children are 
highly conscious of their own sex and are much less likely to play with 
somebody of the opposite sex, particularly a child who is not well known 
to them.9 It seems plausible then that a girl who is adopted when over 
three will be viewed as a stranger by the boy, and treated differently 
from a girl who is adopted when younger.
How could finely tuned sexual preferences arise from early 
experience? The responsiveness to the familiar could be reduced by 
mere exposure, and consequently individuals that differed slightly 
from the known standards would be most attractive. A simple way of 
producing a finely tuned preference displaced away from the familiar 
8  Wolf, A.P. (1994), Sexual Attraction and Childhood Association. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
9  Maccoby, E.E. (1990), Gender and relationships: a developmental account. Amer. 
Psychol. 45.4, 513–520, https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.45.4.513
 737. Avoiding Inbreeding and Incest
could be to superimpose habituation on imprinting. The net effect of 
superimposing one learning process on the other would be to produce 
a sharply peaked preference for something a bit different from the 
familiar. The evolutionary benefits and costs of inbreeding are likely 
to be numerous and to vary in importance from one species to the 
next. Therefore the precise balance will almost certainly differ between 
species. Even within a species, the balance is likely to depend on local 
conditions and on how inbred a population has become. Finally, the 
sexes may differ, especially when one sex is likely to have more matings 
than the other. Nonetheless, a general point remains. When choosing a 
mate an animal may have to pay careful attention, among other things, 
to similarities between its proposed partner and close kin.
Incest taboos
Many authors have suggested that individuals may derive reproductive 
success from incest taboos.10 Those individuals who impose the 
prohibitions do not derive immediate personal benefits from them. 
Social benefits may be derived because the group does not have to 
pay the costs of caring for individuals who in various ways are less fit. 
An attempt to mount a purely eugenic argument would be confused 
because the maladaptive genes expressed when inbreeding is common 
are not removed from the population by preventing inbreeding. Indeed, 
inbreeding is the best way of getting rid of those genes in the long run.
Whether or not people are aware of the effects of inbreeding is 
another issue. In many cultures they are.11 Awareness of the ill-effects of 
inbreeding would be best translated into the conviction that the aware 
individual should not have children with his or her sibling. Nothing 
more is required of Darwinian evolution. The awareness does not 
immediately translate into a conviction that others should be stopped 
from having children with their siblings. 
10  Many authors have linked avoidance of inbreeding with the incest taboo. One of 
the most prominent is Wilson, E.O. (1998), Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf.
11  Durham, W.H. (1991), Coevolution: Genes, Culture and Human Diversity. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
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Did inbreeding avoidance and incest taboos evolve by similar 
mechanisms or do they have a common utility in modern life? Incest 
taboos need not necessarily serve the same function as the inhibitions 
derived from early experience. What other mechanism for the cultural 
evolution of incest taboos should be entertained? Humans might often 
have an inclination to prevent other people behaving in ways in which 
they would not themselves behave. On this view, left-handers were in 
the past forced to adopt the habits of right-handers because the right-
handers found them disturbing. Similarly the moral repugnance that 
many people show for homosexuality between consenting adults is 
often a violent one — in some societies homosexuality may be punished 
by death. In the same way, those who were known to have had sexual 
intercourse with close kin were discriminated against. People who had 
grown up with kin of the opposite sex were generally not attracted to 
those individuals, and disapproved when they discovered others who 
were. On this view, the incest taboo was nothing to do with society not 
wanting to look after the cognitively challenged offspring of inbreeding, 
since in many cases they had no idea that inbreeding was the cause. 
Rather, the disapproval was about suppressing abnormal behaviour, 
which is potentially disruptive in small societies. Such conformity looks 
harsh to modern eyes, even though plenty of examples of it are found 
in contemporary life. 
When so much depended on unity of action in the environment in 
which humans evolved, wayward behaviour could have destructive 
consequences for everybody. It is not difficult to see why conformity 
should have become a powerful trait in human social behaviour.12 Once 
in place, the desire for conformity, on the one hand, and the reluctance 
to inbreed, on the other, would have combined to generate social 
disapproval of inbreeding. The emergence of incest taboos would take 
on different forms, depending on which sorts of people, non-kin as well 
as kin, were likely to be familiar from early life.
In the Anglican Book of Common Prayer there is a table of Kindred and 
Affinity ‘wherein whosoever are related are forbidden by the Church 
of England to marry together’. A man may not marry his mother, sister 
or daughter and a variety of other genetically related individuals. The 
12  Westermarck, E. (1891), The History of Human Marriage. London: Macmillan.
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restrictions for a woman are reciprocal and also, among others, she 
must not marry an uncle, nephew, grandparent or grandchild. The 
list continues with the following exclusions: a man may not marry his 
wife’s father’s mother or his daughter’s son’s wife. At least six of the 
25 types of relationship that preclude marriage involve no genetic link. 
The Church of England did not worry about marriages between first 
cousins. Other cultures do, but here again striking inconsistencies are 
found. In a great many cultures marriages between first cousins who 
have parents of the same sex are forbidden whereas marriages between 
cousins who have parents of different sexes are not only allowed but, in 
many cases, actively encouraged. 
If these ideas are correct, human incest taboos did not arise 
historically from a deliberate intention to avoid the biological costs of 
inbreeding. Rather, in the course of history, two separate mechanisms 
appeared. One was a developmental process concerned with striking an 
optimal balance between inbreeding and outbreeding when choosing 
a mate. The other was concerned with social conformity.13 When these 
two propensities were put together, the result was social disapproval of 
those who chose partners from within their close family. When social 
disapproval was combined with language, verbal rules appeared which 
could be transmitted from generation to generation, first by word of 
mouth and later in written form.
Conclusions
While the incest taboo is not likely to be a result of Darwinian evolution, 
the preference for a mate slightly different from close kin undoubtedly 
is. Other factors also influence mate choice, particularly in humans. The 
attractiveness of a potential mate, the resources he or she might hold, 
and so forth also play a part. But in terms of producing grand-offspring, 
optimal outbreeding is important. The mating preference appears to be 
well designed to achieve that except in modern human society where 
having a lot of grandchildren is not usually important.
13  Westermarck’s ideas are discussed at length in the chapters in Wolf, A.P. & 
Durham, W.H. (eds.) (2004), Inbreeding, Incest and the Incest Taboo. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.

8. Genes in Development 
and Evolution
For the Darwinian evolutionary mechanism to work, something must 
be inherited with fidelity. Even if a single change in DNA provides the 
basis for a distinctive beneficial character of an individual, that is not 
sufficient for the development of the character. This gets to the heart of 
a lively debate in biology.1 Genes have been defined in many different 
ways: as units of physiological function, units of recombination, units 
of mutation, or units of evolutionary process — when they have 
sometimes been imbued with ‘selfish’ intentions in order to help 
the understanding of the complexities of evolution. The problem of 
definition has been made worse as it has become clear that the same 
molecule of DNA may serve in processes that differ in function. In the 
post-genomic era, the emerging concepts of the gene pose a significant 
challenge to conventional assumptions about the relationship between 
1  This debate is well-described in Noble, D. (2016), Dance to the Tune of Life: Biological 
Relativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Denis Noble argues that living 
organisms operate at multiple levels of complexity and must therefore be analysed 
from a multi-scale, relativistic perspective. Noble explains that all biological 
processes operate by means of molecular, cellular and organismal networks. 
The interactive nature of these fundamental processes is at the core of biological 
relativity and, as such, challenges simplified molecular reductionism. Noble 
shows that such an integrative view emerges as the necessary consequence of the 
rigorous application of mathematics to biology. Drawing on his pioneering work 
in the mathematical physics of biology, he shows that what emerges is a deeply 
humane picture of the role of the organism in constraining its chemistry, including 
its genes, to serve the organism as a whole, especially in the interaction with its 
social environment. This humanistic, holistic approach challenges the common 
gene-centred view held by many in modern biology.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.08
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genome structure and function, and between genotype and developed 
characteristics.2
The word ‘gene’ does not, then, have a clear unambiguous meaning.3 
For some scientists it meant simply a sequence of DNA, for others it 
referred specifically to those segments of DNA that are transcribed into 
ribonucleic acid (RNA) and then translated into a protein. By contrast, 
many segments of RNA — the so-called non-coding RNAs — have 
regulatory functions, and the term ‘gene’ is extended by many molecular 
geneticists to include the DNA sequences coding for these RNAs. These 
different meanings of gene sometimes get conflated, with subsequent 
confusion of thought.
Despise the semantic confusion, the use of variations in DNA to identify 
individuals is crucially important in the forensic analysis of crimes. In other 
areas of biology the variation is used to establish relationships between 
species and the probable evolution of taxonomic groups. Moreover the 
technologies for producing new types of crops that are resistant to disease 
or water shortage are now well developed. Scientists collaborating on the 
Human Genome Project have elucidated nearly all the DNA sequences 
on all 23 pairs of chromosomes found in a human cell.4 It is a staggering 
achievement. Much epidemiological research in recent years has been 
based on sequencing the entire human genome and looking at mutant 
alleles that correlate with disease. A surprising result of these genome-
wide association studies has been that, even when large populations are 
studied, and the disease of interest is common, such as Type 1 diabetes, 
few significant genetic effects are found and the effects of any one specific 
difference in DNA are generally small. Single-gene effects are unusual 
and largely restricted to relatively rare diseases, such as phenylketonuria 
or haemophilia. The excitement about what is being done should be 
greatly moderated. ‘The Book of Life’, as one leading scientist called it, 
does not provide the complete story about human nature.
2  See Sultan, S. (2015), Organism and Environment: Ecological Development, Niche 
Construction, and Adaptation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, https://doi.
org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199587070.001.0001
3  Keller, E.F. (2000), Century of the Gene. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
An accessible and clear-headed introduction to genetics is given in Griffiths, P. & 
Stotz, K. (2013), Genetcs and Philosophy: An Introduction. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
4  Many of the DNA strands come in many different forms that provide the basis for 
forensic studies and attempts to discover genetic relationships between people.
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Genes in development
The starting points of development include the genome which provides 
information of a kind.5 They also include factors external to the genome; 
the social and ecological conditions in which the individual grows up 
are crucial. A low-tech cooking metaphor serves to shift the focus onto 
the multi-causal and conditional nature of development. Using butter 
instead of margarine may make a cake taste differently when all the 
other ingredients and cooking methods remain unchanged. But if other 
combinations of ingredients or other cooking methods are used, the 
distinctive difference between a cake made with butter and a cake made 
with margarine may vanish. Similarly, a baked cake cannot readily be 
disaggregated into its original raw ingredients and the various cooking 
processes, any more than a behaviour pattern or a psychological 
characteristic can be disaggregated into its genetic and environmental 
influences and the developmental processes that gave rise to it. In the 
cooking analogy, the raw ingredients represent the many genetic and 
environmental influences, while 
cooking represents the biological 
and psychological processes of 
development. Nobody expects to 
find all the separate ingredients 
represented as discrete, identifiable 
components in a cake. Similarly, 
nobody should expect to find a 
simple correspondence between 
a particular gene (or a particular 
experience) and particular aspects 
of an individual’s behaviour or 
personality.
5  The use of the term information exclusively applied to genes has been sharply 
criticised by Oyams, S. & Lewontin, R. (2000), The Ontogeny of Information. 2nd ed. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822380665. As 
the title of her book suggests, all factors impinging on the developing organism 
provide information of a kind.
The process of making a cake. Photo 
by Roozitaa (2012), Wikimedia, https://
commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Making_
Chiffon_cake_2.jpg, CC BY 3.0.
The language of a gene ‘for’ a particular characteristic is exceedingly 
muddling to the non-scientist — and, if the truth be told, to some 
scientists as well. What the scientists mean (or should mean) is that a 
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genetic difference between two groups is associated with a difference in 
a characteristic. They know perfectly well that other things are important 
and that, even in constant environmental conditions, the outcome 
depends on a combination of many genes. Particular combinations of 
genes have particular effects, and a gene that fits into one combination 
may not fit into another. Unfortunately, the language of a gene ‘for’ a 
characteristic has a way of sometimes seducing scientists themselves 
into believing their own sound-bites. Such language rests on a profound 
misunderstanding.
The notion that genes are simply blueprints for an individual human 
is hopelessly misleading. In a blueprint, the mapping works both ways: 
starting from a finished house, a room can be found on the blueprint, 
just as the room’s position is determined by the blueprint during the 
building process. This straightforward mapping is not true for genes 
and individual human behaviour patterns, in either direction.
The common image of a genetic blueprint for behaviour fails because 
it is too static, suggesting that adult organisms are merely expanded 
versions of the fertilized egg. In reality, developing organisms are 
dynamic systems that play an active role in their own development. Even 
when a particular base in a strand of DNA or a particular experience 
is known to have a powerful negative effect on the development 
of behaviour, biology has an uncanny way of finding alternative 
routes. If the normal developmental pathway to a particular form of 
adult behaviour is impassable, another way may often be found. The 
individual may be able, through its behaviour, to match its environment 
to suit its own characteristics.
Strands of DNA do not, on their own, make behaviour patterns 
or physical attributes. They code for polypeptides, the precursors of 
proteins or small molecules of RNA. The proteins are crucial collectively 
to the functioning of each cell in the body. Some proteins are enzymes, 
controlling biochemical reactions, while others form the physical 
structures of the cell. These protein products of genes do not work in 
isolation, but in a cellular environment created by local conditions. 
The DNA content of an individual organism can be measured 
accurately. When the amount of DNA is compared to the relative size 
of the nervous system and the complexity of behaviour it generates, 
a lack of correlation is surprising. Mice have 6000 times as much 
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DNA as bacteria which makes sense if the differences in the DNA are 
responsible for the differences in complexity. Humans have no more 
DNA than mice. In other words, whatever else happened in evolution, 
the gradual emergence of behavioural complexity within the mammals 
was not achieved by accumulating the genes that code for protein 
components. Some of the lack of association may be explained by the 
number of genes not being the same as the amount of DNA. It may also 
be attributed to ‘junk’ DNA which, it used to be supposed, had no effect 
on the organism’s developed characteristics. The discovery that some 
or all genes in this so-called junk code for small molecules of RNA has 
profound implications for the regulation of development. At the very 
least, it means that the growth of nervous systems and the emergence of 
behaviour are critically dependent on regulation and the combinatorial 
action of genes. This means that the correspondence between genes and 
behaviour is never likely to be simple. Many genes really do code for 
polypeptides, of course, but they represent nothing else since the process 
of development is generative. A small subset of genes and cytoplasmic 
conditions start the whole process after fertilisation of the egg. These 
starting conditions create products that switch off some active genes, 
switch on others and bring the developing components into contact 
with new influences from outside. And so the whole process continues 
until death.
It is clear, then, that because of the system in which they are 
embedded, no simple correspondence is found between individual 
genes and particular behaviour patterns or psychological characteristics. 
Genes do not code for parts of the nervous system and they certainly do 
not code for particular behaviour patterns. Any one aspect of behaviour 
is influenced by many genes, each of which may have a big or a small 
effect. Conversely, changes in any one of many genes can have a major 
disruptive effect on a particular aspect of behaviour. A disconnected 
wire can cause a car to break down, but this does not mean that the wire 
by itself is responsible for making the car move. 
Without a strong set of binding ideas, it isn’t easy to think about all 
aspects of the various strands of evidence, which often seem to point 
in opposite directions. Some theorists have argued that the seemingly 
simple and orderly characteristics of development (such as they 
are) are generated by dynamic processes of great complexity. Many 
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mathematical techniques, such as catastrophe theory and ‘chaos’, have 
been developed to deal analytically with the complexities of dynamical 
systems. A promising empirical approach is collecting evidence across 
different levels of analysis.
Heritability
When offspring look like their parents or other members of their family, 
it is reasonable to assume that they have inherited something. The total 
set of characteristics that are inherited are rarely correlated. So in human 
families a boy might have the big nose of his uncle, the ginger hair of 
his father and the retiring disposition of his grandmother. Mendelian 
inheritance and the recombination of characteristics in each generation 
explains why this should be so. Also, many different processes might be 
involved; most are genetic but some are environmental. Attempts to sort 
out the different possibilities have risen to the concept of heritability. 
Instead of asking whether a child’s characteristics are caused by genes 
or caused by the environment, the question instead became: ‘How much 
is due to each?’ In a more refined form, the question is posed thus: ‘How 
much of the variation between individuals in a given character is due to 
differences in their genes, and how much is due to differences in their 
environments?’
The meaning of heritability is best illustrated with an uncontroversial 
characteristic such as height, which is clearly influenced by both the 
individual’s family background (genetic influences) and nutrition 
(environmental influences). The variation between individuals in 
height attributable to variation in their genes may be expressed as a 
proportion of the total variation within the population sampled. This 
index is known as the heritability ratio. The higher the figure, which can 
vary between 0 and 1.0, the greater the contribution of genetic variation 
to individual variation in that characteristic. So, if people differed in 
height solely because they differed in their genes, the heritability of 
height would be 1.0; if, on the other hand, variation in height arose 
entirely from individual differences in environmental factors such as 
nutrition then the heritability would be zero. 
Calculating a single number to describe the relative contribution of 
genes and environment has obvious attractions. Estimates of heritability 
 838. Genes in Development and Evolution
are of undoubted value to animal breeders, for example. Given a 
standard set of environmental conditions, the genetic strain to which a 
pig belongs will predict its adult body size better than other variables 
such as the number of piglets in a sow’s litter. If the animal in question 
is a cow and the breeder is interested in maximising its milk yield, then 
knowing that milk yield is highly heritable in a particular strain of cows 
reared under standard rearing conditions is important.
Behind the deceptively plausible ratios lurk some fundamental 
problems. For a start, the heritability of any given characteristic is not 
a fixed and absolute quantity — tempted though many scientists have 
believed otherwise. Its value depends on a number of variable factors, 
such as the particular population of individuals that has been sampled. 
For instance, if heights are measured only among people from affluent 
backgrounds, then the total variation in height will be much smaller 
than if the sample also includes people who are small because they 
have been undernourished. The heritability of height will consequently 
be larger in a population of exclusively well-nourished people than it 
would be among people drawn from a wider range of environments. 
Conversely, if the heritability of height is based on a population with 
relatively similar genotypes — say, native Icelanders — then the figure 
will be lower than if the population is genetically more heterogeneous; 
for example, if it includes both Icelanders and African Pygmies. Thus, 
attempts to measure the relative contributions of genes and environment 
to a particular characteristic are highly dependent on who has been 
measured and in what conditions.
Another problem with heritability estimates is that they reveal 
nothing about the ways in which genes and environment contribute to 
the biological and psychological processes of development. This point 
becomes obvious when considering the heritability of a characteristic 
such as ‘walking on two legs’. Humans walk on fewer than two legs 
only as a result of environmental influences such as war wounds, car 
accidents, disease or exposure to toxins before birth. In other words, all 
the variation within the human population results from environmental 
influences, and consequently the heritability of ‘walking on two legs’ 
is zero. And yet walking on two legs is clearly a fundamental property 
of being human, and is one of the more obvious biological differences 
between humans and other great apes such as chimpanzees or gorillas. 
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It obviously depends heavily on genes, despite having a heritability 
of zero in humans. A low heritability clearly does not mean that 
development is unaffected by genes.
The effects of a particular set of genes depend critically on the 
environment in which they are expressed, while the effects of a 
particular sort of environment depend on the individual’s genes. 
Even in animal breeding programmes that use heritability estimates to 
practical advantage, care is still needed. If breeders wish to export a 
particular genetic strain of cows that yields a lot of milk, they would be 
wise to check that the strain will continue to give high milk yields under 
the different environmental conditions of another country. 
Epigenetics
The often uncanny similarities between identical twins provide 
striking evidence for the importance of genes in shaping physical and 
behavioural characteristics. On the other hand identical twins can differ 
markedly from each other.6 The cues that come from the environment 
are often those that regulate the regulators. Much of the plasticity seen 
in development is generated this way. The course of an individual’s 
development may be radically different depending on the nature of 
these cues. Individuals with identical genomes do not necessarily have 
identical adult characteristics. In the case of schizophrenia for instance 
one identical twin may develop the disease while the other does not. 
Identical twins reared apart are sometimes more like each other than 
those reared together.7 To put it another way, rearing two genetically 
identical individuals in the same environment can make them less 
similar. This fact pleases neither the extreme environmental determinist 
nor the extreme genetic determinist. The environmental determinist 
supposes that twins reared apart must have different experiences and 
should therefore be more dissimilar in their behaviour than twins who 
grow up together in the same environment. The genetic determinist 
does not expect to find any behavioural differences between genetically 
6  See Spector, T. (2012), Identically Different: Why You Can Change Your Genes. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
7  Shields, J. (1962), Monozygotic Twins Brought up Apart and Brought up Together. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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identical twins reared together; if they have had the same genes and the 
same environment, then how can they be different? Of course, one twin 
provides a social environment for the other and often one sibling will 
not do what the other one is doing.
All processes involved in development have been subsumed under 
the heading of epigenetics. In a restricted sense, epigenetic processes 
are those that result in the silencing or activation of gene expression 
through such modification of the roles of DNA or its associated RNA 
and protein. The term has therefore come to describe, for many, 
those molecular mechanisms through which both dynamic and stable 
changes in gene expression are achieved, and ultimately how variations 
in extracellular input and experience by the whole organism of its 
environment can modify regulation of DNA expression. Some authors 
continue to use this broader definition of epigenetics to describe all 
the developmental processes, behavioural and physiological as well 
as molecular, that bear on the character of the organism.8 In all these 
usages, epigenetics usually refers to what happens within an individual 
8  The developmental processes involved were subsumed under the general heading of 
‘epigenetics’ by Waddington, C.H. (1957) in The Strategy of the Genes (London: Allen 
& Unwin). He distinguished this term from the eighteenth-century term ‘epigenesis’, 
which had been used to oppose the notion that all the characteristics of the adult were 
preformed in the embryo. More recently, epigenetics has become mechanistically 
defined as the molecular processes by which traits defined by a given profile of 
gene expression can persist across mitotic cell divisions, but which do not involve 
changes in the nucleotide sequence of the DNA (see Carey, N. (2012). The Epigenetics 
Revolution: How Modern Biology is Rewriting Our Understanding of Genetics, Disease and 
Inheritance. London: Icon Books Ltd.). The general principles apply at higher levels of 
organisation and are involved in mediating many aspects of developmental plasticity 
seen in intact organisms. For that reason, some authors continue to use Waddington’s 
broader definition of epigenetics to describe all the developmental processes that 
bear on the character of the organism. The processes involved in gene expression 
and suppression can be transmitted from one generation to the next (See Gissis, S.B. 
& Jablonka, E. (2011), Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular 
Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, and Miska, E.A. & Ferguson-Smith, A.C. (2016), 
Transgenerational inheritance: models and mechanisms of non-DNA sequence-
based inheritance, Science 354. 6308, 59–63, https://doi.org/10.1126/science.aaf4945). 
Further support for the revision of the orthodoxies of evolutionary theory has 
come from microbiology (Shapiro, J. (2011), Evolution: A View from the 21st Century. 
Upper Saddle River, NJ: FT Press Science). Shapiro argues that cells must be viewed 
as complex systems that control their own growth, reproduction and shape their 
own evolution over time. He referred to it as a ‘systems engineering’ perspective 
and noted interestingly that, ‘Most of the interactions between biomolecules tend 
to be relatively weak and need multiple synergistic attachments to produce stable 
functional complexes’ (Shapiro, 2011: 31).
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developing organism. Whether a broad or restricted view of epigenetics 
is taken, the discovery of epigenetic phenomena has led to a revolution 
in thinking about the importance of developmental processes. 
The molecular processes involved in the development of an 
organisms characteristics were initially worked out for the regulation 
of cellular  and proliferation. All cells within the body contain the 
same genetic sequence information, yet each lineage has undergone 
specialisation to become a skin cell, hair cell, heart cell, and so forth. 
These differences within a developing individual are inherited from 
mother cells to daughter cells. The process of differentiation involves the 
expression of particular genes for each cell type in response to cues from 
neighbouring cells and the extracellular environment, with the silencing 
of others. Genes that have been silenced at an earlier stage remain silent 
after each cell division (except in cancers). Such gene silencing provides 
each cell lineage with its characteristic pattern of gene expression. These 
epigenetic marks are faithfully duplicated across each cell division, 
stable cell differentiation results and serves many different functions. 
Molecular mechanisms are involved in the activation or silencing 
of genes. One of the silencing mechanisms involves a process known 
as methylation. Chromosomes consist of strands of chromatin. DNA is 
organized along chromatin in packets known as nucleosomes. These 
have a molecule with a hydrogen atom on one of its arms. If this is 
replaced by a methyl group, the nucleosomes close up and the DNA 
is less able to be expressed as messenger RNA which in turn forms the 
template for synthesising protein. Conversely if the methyl group is 
replaced by a hydrogen atom, the DNA on the affected nucleosomes 
can be expressed. 
An important mechanism in development involves small molecules 
of non-coding micro-RNA. When these small molecules are expressed 
they may bind onto messenger RNA which links as an intermediate 
between DNA and protein, with the result that the gene that expressed 
the messenger RNA loses its capacity to code for protein and is effectively 
silenced. The regulators have themselves to be regulated, and unraveling 
the networks will take a great deal of research, but the general principles 
involved in producing differences in cell lines are already apparent.
Many examples in biology demonstrate the dependence of gene 
expression on local conditions. After a fire on the high grassland planes 
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of East Africa, for example, the young grasshoppers are black instead 
of being the normal pale yellowish-green. Something has switched the 
course of their development onto a different track. The grasshopper’s 
colour makes a big difference to the risk that it will be spotted and eaten 
by a bird, and the scorched grassland may remain black for many months 
after a fire. So matching its body colour to the blackened background is 
important for its survival. The developmental mechanism for making 
this switch in body colour is automatic and depends on the amount of 
light reflected from the ground.9 If the young grasshoppers are placed on 
black paper they become black when they moult to the next stage. But if 
they are placed on pale paper the moulting grasshoppers are the normal 
green colour. The grasshoppers actively select habitats with the colour 
that match their own. If the colour of the background changes they can 
also change their colour at the next moult to match the background, 
but once they reach adulthood they are committed to one colour. This 
striking example illustrates at the level of the whole organism the role 
of epigenetics in development.
Selfish genes
Turning to evolutionary processes, a crucial question is at what level of 
organisation does the process of Darwinian evolution act? The selfish 
gene approach made famous by Richard Dawkins10 has been valuable 
in helping to understand self-sacrifice, and conflicts between the sexes 
and generations. The language of genes having metaphorical intentions 
helps people to deal with the complicated dynamics of evolution. Such 
explanations are not meant to be treated in the way usually employed 
by an experimental scientist; they provide a framework in which to 
think about phenomena that would otherwise be neglected.
9  Rowell, C.H.F. (1971), The variable coloration of the acridoid grasshoppers. Adv. 
Insect Physiol. 8, 145–198, https://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2806(08)60197-6
10  Dawkins, R. (1976), The Selfish Gene. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Most people get their minds around complex processes when 
they attribute intentions to them. It is a powerful way of thinking 
about systems. Weather forecasters, having to cope with explaining 
appallingly complex problems, make statements like: ‘The depression 
is trying to move in from the west’. The language encourages thought 
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about endpoints rather than with all the 
details of how they are achieved.
Is the gene the target of selection in 
evolution? It may be helpful to forget 
biology for a moment and think about 
the spread of a new brand of biscuit 
in supermarkets. Consider the spread 
from the perspective of the recipe. While 
shoppers select biscuits and eat them, it 
is the recipe for making desirable biscuits 
that survives and spreads in the long 
run. A phrase in the recipe might specify 
the amount of sugar to be added and 
makes the difference between a popular 
and a less popular biscuit. In that sense 
it is selfish. This novel way of looking at 
things is unlikely to mislead anyone into 
believing that what shoppers really do 
in supermarkets, when they pick a particular brand of biscuit off the 
shelves, is select a word in the recipe used for making the biscuits. They 
select the brand of biscuit they like.
Darwin used his metaphor of ‘natural selection’ because he was 
impressed by the ways in which plant and animal breeders artificially 
selected the characters they sought to perpetuate. The agents of 
differential survival and differential reproductive success will usually 
be characteristics of whole individuals including the structures they 
make, but they might be characteristics of molecules or of symbiotic 
groups, or the evolvability of taxonomic lineages. 
The power of the selfish gene language has been used misleadingly to 
prop up the idea of the gene as ‘programmer’. The mechanistic language 
does not translate into the teleological language. For population 
geneticists, a genetic difference is identified by means of a biochemical, 
physiological, structural or behavioural difference between organisms 
(after other potential sources of difference have been excluded by 
appropriate procedures). The popular language of genes’ intentions 
and the more orthodox language of genetic differences are not simply 
alternative ways of describing the same thing. In the technically precise 
Richard Dawkins author of The 
Selfish Gene. Photo by Marty 
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language of population geneticists, a genetic allele must be compared 
with another from which it differs in its consequences. In selfish-gene 
language, it stands alone as an entity, absolute in its own right. The 
perception generated by one meaning of gene does not relate to the 
same evidence as that generated by the other.
Conclusions
An important point, often made but equally often ignored, is that 
correlations between the behaviour patterns of the parent and those 
of the  do not necessarily arise because they have genes in common. 
They may arise because other conditions that are necessary for 
the peculiarities of their behaviour are shared. Common odours 
and preferences for familiar smells might arise from the particular 
combination of bacteria that breakdown the fats secreted onto the body 
surface. When the bacteria pass from mother to offspring, so does the 
source of her special smell. This is not to downplay the roles of genes. 
But it emphasises that the nothing-but approach to genes is clearly 
wrong. Taking a systems approach to the role of genes generates much 
more fruitful understanding than treating them as providing single 
causes for development and evolution.

9. Active Role of Behaviour
The ability of animals to respond differentially to one of several options 
is an important part of adaptive behaviour. In colloquial terms they 
make a choice. Charles Darwin suggested that members of one sex 
choose to mate with individuals with a striking feature such as the 
tail of the male peacock. Choice can take many different forms. One is 
involved in predators’ choice of prey. When gazelle see a predator like 
a cheetah they jump into the air, a behaviour pattern called ‘stotting’. 
Cheetah seem to learn not to chase jumping gazelle.1 A similar case is 
the small falcon, the merlin, which takes other small birds on the wing.2 
When it hunts flying skylarks, its potential prey start singing. The more 
the skylark sings, the more likely is the merlin to abandon the chase 
and hunt for other skylarks that don’t sing so much. The merlin has 
probably learned that the skylark singing a lot is more vigorous and 
more difficult to catch and chooses to attack other individuals.
Apparent design emerges, even when it is at the end of the long 
and complicated process of development. Development depends on 
the constancy of many genetic and environmental conditions. If any of 
these conditions changes, as can happen to environmental conditions 
when organisms move away from the natal area, the characteristics of 
the organism can also change. High mobility by organisms would have 
1  Fitzgibbon, C.D. & Fanshawe, J.H. (1988), Stotting in Thomson’s gazelles: an 
honest signal of condition. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 23.2, 69–74, https://doi.org/10.1007/
bf00299889
2  Cresswell, W. (1994), Song as a pursuit-deterrent signal, and its occurrence relative 
to other anti-predation behaviours of skylark (Alauda arvensis) on attack by merlins 
(Falco columbarius). Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 34.3, 217–223, https://doi.org/10.1007/
bf00167747
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.09
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frequently placed them in conditions that revealed heritable variation 
not previously apparent in the population. By their mobility, in the 
case of animals, or facility to disperse their seeds in the case of plants, 
organisms would have exposed themselves to new conditions that 
might reveal heritable variability. 
The environment does not simply set a problem to which the organism 
has to find a solution. The organism can do a great deal to select or 
create an environment to which it is best suited. For example beavers 
dam rivers, flood valleys and create private lakes for themselves. The 
concepts derived from such examples have been developed extensively 
and they are now referred to collectively as ‘niche construction’.3 The 
effects of behavioural control can be especially great when a major 
component of the environmental conditions with which animals have 
to cope is provided by their social environment. When individuals 
compete with each other within a social group, the outcome of the 
competition depends in part on each individual’s capacity to predict 
what the other will do.
3  Laland, K.N., Odling Smee, J. & Gilbert, S.F. (2008), Evo-devo and niche construction: 
building bridges. Journal of Experimental Evolution 310B, 549-566.
Lake created by beavers damming a river (2005), Wikimedia, https://commons.wikimedia.
org/wiki/Algonquin_Provincial_Park#/media/File:Biberdamm_2_db.jpg, Public Domain.
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Play behaviour, prominent in young mammals and some birds, is 
spontaneous and rewarding to the individual; it is intrinsically motivated 
and its performance serves as a goal in itself. The player is to some 
extent protected from the normal consequences of serious behaviour. 
The behaviour appears to have no immediate practical goal or benefit. 
Playing with other individuals may be preceded or accompanied by 
specific signals or facial expressions indicating that the behaviour is 
not to be taken as a threat. Play is the antithesis of ‘work’ or ‘serious’ 
behaviour. The behaviour consists of actions and, in the case of humans, 
thoughts, expressed in novel combinations. When playing with others, 
a normally dominant individual may become temporarily subordinate. 
Individual actions or thoughts are performed repeatedly; they may 
also be incomplete or exaggerated relative to non-playful behaviour in 
adults; play looks different. Play is sensitive to prevailing conditions 
and occurs only when the player is free from illness or stress. Play is 
an indicator of well-being. Playful play is accompanied by a particular 
positive mood state in which the individual is more inclined to behave 
in a spontaneous and flexible way.4 
When young animals playfully practise the stereotyped movements 
they will use in earnest later in life, they are likely to improve the 
coordination and effectiveness of these behaviour patterns. The short 
dashes and jumps of a young gazelle when it is playing bring benefits 
that may be almost immediate, as it faces the threat of predation from 
4  A full discussion of play is given in Bateson, P. & Martin, P. (2013), Play, Playfulness, 
Creativity and Innovation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ‘Playfulness’ is 
a positive mood state that facilitates and accompanies ‘playful play’, a subset of 
broadly defined play. A distinction is drawn between playful play and non-playful 
play. Playfulness, the defining feature of playful play, is a positive mood state that 
is not always detectable in observable behaviour. The behaviour of a playful human 
is captured by numerous synonyms, including cheerful, frisky, frolicsome, good-
natured, joyous, merry, rollicking, spirited, sprightly and vivacious. Some of these 
terms relate to human emotions that could not be readily identified in animals 
without much anthropomorphic projection. Some, though, are descriptive of 
visible behaviour and can be defined ostensively, such as when two kittens engage 
vigorously in social play. In animals, as in humans, playfulness may be inferred 
from the context in which it occurs. What the animals do may vary — from playing 
with objects at one moment to playing with another individual at the next — but the 
playful state underlying their behaviour is the same.
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cheetah or other carnivores and needs considerable skill when escaping.5 
Even though the benefits may be immediate in such cases, they may 
also persist into adult life.
5  Gomendio, M. (1988), The development of different types of play in gazelles: 
implications for the nature and functions of play. Anim. Behav. 36.3, 825–836, https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0003-3472(88)80165-9
Many theories of the functions of play have continued to focus on 
its role in enabling the developing individual to acquire and practise 
complex physical skills and, by so doing, fine tune neuromuscular 
systems. Others theories, derived 
from observing how much young 
animals play with each other, have 
emphasised how individuals also 
develop social skills and cement 
their social relationships; play 
may also serve to improve the 
individual’s capacity to compete 
and cooperate with other members 
of their own species. Play can make 
an individual more resistant to 
stress, and enlarge its repertoire. 
Play may enhance an individual’s 
resourcefulness and flexibility 
and make it able to adjust to new 
conditions. Play may enhance its 
ability to cooperate with others and to co-exist with older members of 
its own species. Play may increase its knowledge of its home range. Play, 
or at least some components of it, allows young animals to simulate, in 
a relatively safe context, potentially dangerous situations that will arise 
in their adult life. They learn from their mistakes, but do so in relative 
safety. On this view, play exerts its most important developmental 
effects on risky adult behaviour such as fighting, mating in the face of 
serious competition, catching dangerous prey, and avoiding becoming 
someone else’s prey. Indeed, the behaviour patterns of fighting and 
prey-catching are especially obvious in the play of cats and other 
predators, whereas safe activities such as grooming, defecating and 
urinating have no playful counterparts.
Dog soliciting play with a bow. Photo by 
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When differences between the sexes arise in play, as they often do, 
these are reflected in differences between the sexes in the activities 
of adults. For instance young female chimpanzees seem to behave 
maternally towards sticks, 
doing so much more than 
males and ceasing to do 
so when they have real 
offspring to care for.6 
One study showed that 
stick-carrying consisted 
of holding or cradling 
detached sticks pieces of 
bark, small logs or woody 
vine with their hand or 
mouth, underarm or, 
most commonly, tucked 
between the abdomen 
and thigh. Individuals sometimes carried sticks for periods of up to four 
hours or more during which they rested, walked, climbed, slept and 
fed as usual. The occurrence of stick-carrying peaked among juveniles 
and was higher in females than males. This sex difference could not 
be explained by a general propensity for females to play with objects 
more than males, because several types of object such as weapons were 
played with more by males. Males in many species, including humans, 
perform more rough and tumble play than females and engage in more 
violent activities when adult.
Play has features that are likely to make it suitable for finding the best 
way forward in a world of conflicting demands. In acquiring cognitive 
skills, individuals are in danger of finding sub-optimal solutions to 
the many problems that confront them. In deliberately moving away 
from what might look like the final end state, each individual may 
arrive somewhere that is better. Play may therefore fulfil an important 
probing role that enables the individual to escape from false end-points 
or ‘local optima’. An analogy is a mountain surrounded by lesser peaks. 
6  Kahlenberg, S.M. & Wrangham, R.W. (2010), Sex differences in chimpanzees’ 
use of sticks as play objects resemble those of children. Current Biol. 20.24, 
R1067-R1068, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2010.11.024
Siberian tiger mum and daughter play-fighting. Photo by 
Tambako The Jaguar (2011), Flickr, https://www.flickr.
com/photos/tambako/6831507351, CC BY-ND 2.0.
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A climber might get to the top of a lesser peak only to discover that he or 
she had to descend before scaling a higher one. When the metaphorical 
climber is on a lower peak, active ways of getting off it can be highly 
beneficial. In practice what this could mean that the activities involved 
in play discover possibilities that are better than those obtained without 
play. 
All short-term quantitative studies of play in animals find that some 
individuals play more than others. In humans, five main dimensions 
have been used to describe the variation in personalities. Many of 
these are not usually regarded as attributes of cognitive ability, but the 
dimension ‘Openness to Experience’ is one that could have developed 
as the result of play. The descriptions of people on one dimension 
range from Creativity to Analytical Ability. In a survey of humans, the 
individuals who believed that they were playful also believed that they 
were creative.7 Respondents were asked to offer ideas for the uses of 
two items, a jam jar and a paperclip. In the literature on creativity, those 
individuals who produce few answers are referred to as ‘convergers’ 
and those who produce many suggestions are known as ‘divergers’. 
The typical sole response from a converger when asked for uses for a 
paper clip was ‘Clip paper together’. The response from one diverger in 
the survey was: ‘Clip papers, unfold to clean fingernails, general clothes 
fixing in an emergency, put on a magnet for a science experiment for 
children, make a mobile with lots of them, make a sculpture with one 
or more of them, earrings, pick a lock’. If there had no been a cut-off 
after ten answers, this person would probably have gone on. Most of the 
respondents provided a relatively small number of uses for the objects 
and only a few offered many uses. The respondents who regarded 
themselves as playful and producers of new ideas were much more 
likely to give lots of uses.
The differences between individuals might reflect the variation in 
almost every character of body and behaviour. It might instead (or 
in addition) reflect the benefits of being different from others. In a 
population that consists mostly of females it is advantageous to be a 
male — and vice versa. In cooperative species, providing a particular set 
of skills may complement a different set possessed by others. In humans 
7  Bateson, P. & Nettle, D. (2014), Playfulness, ideas, and creativity: a survey. Creativity 
Research J. 26.2, 219–222, https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419.2014.901091 
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those who suggest new ways of looking at the world are complemented 
by others who put such ideas to good use. Creativity and innovation are 
mutually beneficial but not necessarily found in the same person.8
Environmental change
The environment does not cease to be important even if it normally 
remains constant. Change the environment and the outcome of an 
individual’s development may be utterly different. Indeed, if an 
individual does not inherit its parents’ environment along with their 
genes and other transmittable factors, it may not be well adapted to the 
conditions in which it now finds itself. Its behaviour may enable it to 
cope. 
A rule for learning, or for any other kind of developmental process, 
is not simply a gene written large. A straightforward correspondence 
between a gene and a rule for changing behaviour is no more likely 
than a straightforward relationship between gene and behaviour (see 
Chapter 8). The same point applies with equal force to all the other 
epigenetic rules that bring order to development. Presumably, if the 
rules have any universality in natural conditions, the experience that 
affects them must be a common feature of all the animals having those 
rules. Alternatively, they must be well buffered against change by the 
particular conditions in which an individual finds itself. 
When behaviour changes in response to alterations in the 
environment, it seems likely that the specific ways in which animals 
tune their behaviour to local conditions are themselves the products of 
Darwinian evolution. If rules for learning fit the animal’s information-
gathering equipment to particular problems and which may have been 
subject to Darwinian evolution, then the conditions necessary for their 
development must pass in some way from one generation to the next. 
While the mode of transmission may commonly involve genes, the rules 
for modifying behaviour are hardly likely to spring fully armed out of 
the genome. Criticism of the assertion that genes code for behaviour 
that is not learned applies just as forcibly to the rules that are involved 
8  The distinction between creativity and innovation is emphasised in Bateson, P. & 
Martin, P. (2013), Play, Playfulness, Creativity and Innovation.
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in the development of behaviour. Such rules represent the workings of 
an already functional nervous system and body. They themselves have 
to develop and depend on structures that require for their development 
a complex interplay between the products of many genes and many 
conditions external to the genome. 
Many features of the inferred rules for learning seem to be profoundly 
modified by experience. For instance, whether or not initially neutral 
cues are treated as potentially relevant or ignored is greatly affected by 
the animal’s prior history. Such selectivity in responsiveness to external 
conditions can be of great use to the animal. In many experiments on 
associative learning monkeys are rewarded with food. The machines 
that dispense the food are commonly designed to drop peanuts into a 
cup when the monkey is to be rewarded. Many monkeys do not like 
the peanuts at first. They have to be deprived of their regular food 
and accustomed to the peanuts for weeks before they will take them 
with any readiness, let alone treat the nuts as rewards for appropriate 
behaviour. In such cases, which are not exceptional, experience expands 
the range of what the monkeys regard as acceptable food.
It might be argued that a spontaneously expressed rule could still 
be detected at work behind the scenes, since the general category of 
food, and its effectiveness as a reward, was in some sense built in. In 
other cases, though, it becomes more difficult to pinpoint what might or 
might not act as a reward without extensive knowledge of the animal’s 
previous experience. For instance, the condition in which it becomes 
possible for an animal to perform an act that would bring it food 
becomes rewarding in itself. So the animal will work in order to provide 
itself with those conditions. In this way, lengthy chains of behaviour can 
be developed with one event providing the terminating condition for 
one action and the enabling condition for the next. This is the basis for 
many complex circus acts performed by animals.
An adaptation of an animal’s behaviour to the environment in which 
it lives gives the appearance of good design. The adaptations are often 
the result of Darwinian evolution, but the adaptability of organisms will 
mean that the adaptations may have developed during the lifetime of the 
individual. An individual whose body has been damaged in an accident 
or who is burdened with a mutation that renders its body radically 
different from other individuals may be able to accommodate to such 
 999. Active Role of Behaviour
abnormality. In doing so, the individual may develop novel structures 
and behaviour not seen in other individuals of the same species. Such 
accommodation can be particularly marked when it occurs early in 
development. A goat born without forelimbs walked about on its hind 
legs and developed a peculiar musculature and skeleton. A modern 
instance is a bipedal domestic dog.9 The animals have coped with an 
abnormality by accommodating to it, producing coordinated changes 
in functionally related characters. Similarly, humans born with limb 
abnormalities as a result of exposure to a teratogen such as thalidomide 
develop strategies to cope, for example, by handling objects using their 
feet or teeth in ways for which others might use their hands.
The capacity of the individual to respond to neural damage is 
remarkable, particularly when the damage occurs early in life. In such 
cases described in humans, the brain reorganises and morphologically 
can look markedly different from the brain of a normal individual. Even 
so, the effects on behaviour may be scarcely detectable and the plasticity 
at the neural level may be accompanied by robust development at the 
behavioural level.
Another form of ‘coping’, found especially during early development, 
arises when the organism must make immediate responses to survive 
a challenge but, in contrast to accommodation responses, the normal 
developmental sequence is not necessarily disrupted. Although these 
responses may involve either structural or temporal changes in the 
course of development, they do not entail a fundamental change in the 
normal pattern of development. Thus, the phenotypic consequences are 
not as marked as those that involve accommodation, but they may have 
a costs and become disadvantageous to the individual later in life.
Conclusions
Individuals differ for a variety of reasons, some genetic and some 
stochastic. Undoubtedly their plasticity, which comes in many forms, 
also contributes greatly to the variation commonly found in most 
populations. The processes involved in plasticity can operate at many 
9  The remarkable ability of Faith, the two-legged dog, can be viewed on YouTube 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5QKG3CKZTYU
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different levels, ranging from the molecular to the behavioural, some 
involving adaptability to what may be novel challenges and some 
responding conditionally to local circumstances. Differences between 
individuals can be triggered in a variety of ways, some mediated 
through the parent’s characteristics. Sometimes phenotypic variation 
arises because the environment triggers a developmental response that 
is appropriate to those ecological conditions. Sometimes the organism 
‘makes the best of a bad job’ in suboptimal conditions. Sometimes 
the buffering processes of development may not cope with what has 
been thrown at the organism, and a bizarre phenotype is generated. 
Whatever the appearance of a well-designed organism’s characteristics, 
the various forms of plasticity illustrate why individuals of the same 
species can differ so much.
10. Adaptability in Evolution
Compelling examples of the interplay between genes and the 
environment may be found throughout the animal and plant kingdoms 
(see Chapter 8). Genetically identical individuals may develop in 
different ways, depending on environmental cues they received when 
they were young. 
Well-meaning attempts to break out of the nature-nurture straitjacket 
have often resulted in a bewildering portrayal of development as a 
process of impenetrable complexity. Indeed, development seemed 
so unfathomably complex to eighteenth-century biologists that they 
believed that it must depend on supernatural guidance. On the surface 
the processes involved in behavioural development do indeed look 
forbiddingly complicated.
Order underlies even those learning processes that make individuals 
different from each other. Knowing something of the underlying 
regularities in development does bring an understanding of what 
happens to the child as it grows up. The ways in which learning is 
structured, for instance, affect how the child makes use of environmental 
contingencies and how the child classifies perceptual experience. Yet 
predicting precisely how an individual child will develop in the future 
from knowledge of the developmental rules for learning is no easier than 
predicting the course of a chess game. The rules influence the course 
of a life, but they do not determine it. Like chess players, children are 
active agents. They influence their environment and are in turn affected 
by what they have done. Furthermore, children’s responses to new 
conditions will, like chess players’ responses, be refined or embellished as 
they gather experience. Sometimes normal development of a particular 
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.10
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ability requires input from the environment at a particular time; what 
happens next depends on the character of that input. The upshot is that, 
despite their underlying regularities, developmental processes seldom 
proceed in straight lines. Big changes in the environment may have no 
effect whatsoever, whereas some small changes may have big effects.
A more general point is that the development of individuals is readily 
perceived as an interplay between them and their environment. The 
current state influences which genes are expressed, and gene expression 
depends on the animal’s social and physical world. Individuals are then 
seen as choosing and changing the conditions to which they are exposed. 
The question, though, is within what limits will the developmental 
systems, dynamic as they are, produce the same result. A developmental 
system that had been sufficiently perturbed would be expected to lead 
to a markedly different outcome. 
Sometimes the perturbations produced by the new set of conditions 
may be such that developmental processes generate maladaptive 
outcomes — such as flippers instead of arms when the human embryo 
had been exposed to thalidomide. If conditions are changed enough, 
developmental stability is no longer maintained. The biological 
equivalent of an earthquake occurs and the appearance of organisms 
may suddenly change. If such a change occurs early in development, 
the effects may ramify and generate a radically different outcome. Even 
spontaneously expressed behaviour is only buffered from environmental 
conditions within certain limits. Changes in conditions may kill the 
animal, but they can also open up important new avenues for subsequent 
evolutionary change. That is why knowledge of development impinges 
on studies of evolution and why genetic determinism has stultified 
thought about the nature of evolution.
Studies of development and evolution are logically distinct. 
Knowledge of how a particular automobile has been assembled does 
not tell us anything about the evolution of automobile design and the 
same is true of living organisms. The outcome of evolutionary processes 
is expressed in an individual’s development. Furthermore, Darwinian 
evolution acts on the outcome of developmental processes.1 The 
1  The mantra among most evolutionary biologists used to be that evolution involves 
changes in the frequencies of genes. By contrast Waddington argued that Darwinian 
evolution acts on the outcomes of development (Waddington, C.H. (1975), The 
Evolution of an Evolutionist. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press). In other words 
evolution involves changes in phenotypes. 
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growing awareness of the emergent properties of developing systems 
does, therefore, have implications for evolutionary biologists who 
traditionally have entertained rather simple notions of what happens 
in development. Considering all the factors that are involved in 
development, including the genes, emphasises the benefits of adopting 
a systems approach. 
The likelihood that one group of factors is exclusively important in 
development and evolution would seem odd to gardeners who have 
a good understanding of how the character of the soil, the presence of 
symbiotic activity of fungae next to the roots, the amount of fertilizer 
supplied, and so forth, all affect how well the plant thrives. Similarly 
sensitive dog and cat breeders, irrespective of the breed, know how 
important is the early age of socialisation to the pet’s friendliness to 
humans. People who cook for themselves, know how important is the 
choice of ingredients that will work well together and on the length and 
temperature of cooking. 
Examples of condition-dependent development do not pose any 
problems for evolutionary theory, even though they should give 
pause to those who search for universals within a given species. From 
a Darwinian standpoint, the development of characteristics that are 
appropriate to the circumstances in which the individual finds itself 
makes a great deal of sense. 
The many examples of conditional responses to the environment 
illustrate an important aspect of development that has intriguing 
implications for humans. Do people have the capacity to live alternative 
lives? Individual humans are bathed in the values of their own particular 
culture and become committed by their early experience to behaving in 
one of many possible ways. Differences in early linguistic experience, for 
example, have obvious and long-lasting effects. In general, individual 
humans imbibe the particular characteristics of their culture by learning 
from older people even if unwittingly. 
When environmental conditions influence a particular 
developmental route in animals, the mechanisms involved are likely to 
be different; learning may not enter into the picture at all. Even so, is 
it possible that some aspects of human development are triggered by 
the environment? Was each individual conceived with the capacity to 
develop along a number of different tracks each of which is adapted 
to circumstances in which the individual may find itself? People 
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who grow up in impoverished conditions tend to have a smaller 
body size, a lower metabolic rate and a reduced level of behavioural 
activity. These responses to early deprivation are generally regarded 
as pathological — just three of the many damaging consequences of 
poverty. The long-term effects on health of a low birth weight may 
simply be by-products of the continuing social and economic conditions 
that stunted growth in the first place. Ignorance and shortage of money 
make the prevention and treatment of disease more difficult; over-
crowding, bad working conditions and poverty produce psychological 
stress and increase the risk of infection. People with little money have 
poorer diets, and adverse social or physical factors that foster depression 
and hopelessness increase the risks of disease. In industrialised nations 
the poor and the unemployed have more illnesses and die sooner than 
the affluent. 
Despite all the well-known effects of poverty, in less extreme 
conditions they could also be viewed as part of a package of characteristics 
that are appropriate to the conditions in which the individual grows 
up — in other words, adaptations to an environment that is chronically 
short of food, rather than merely the pathological by-products of a bad 
diet. Having a lower metabolic rate, reduced activity and a smaller body 
all help to reduce energy expenditure, which can be crucial when food 
is usually in short supply. To put it simply, they might be adaptations 
to make the best of a bad job.2 
If this idea is correct, what about those individuals that are born as 
big babies who end up in an impoverished environment? The evidence 
is much weaker, but in general it supports the view that people born 
in affluent conditions are at greater risk during periods of prolonged 
famine than those who experienced lower levels of nutrition during pre-
natal development. Children born to affluent parents are more likely to 
suffer adverse effects if they are starved in adulthood. In concentration 
camps and the worst prisoner-of-war camps, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that the physically large individuals died first while at least 
some of the small individuals survived. In a famine-exposed Ethiopian 
population, high birth weight was associated with a nine-fold greater 
2  Gluckman, P.D., Hanson, M.A. & Buklijas, T. (2010), A conceptual framework for 
the developmental origins of health and disease. J. Devel. Origins Health Disease 1.01, 
6–18, https://doi.org/10.1017/s2040174409990171
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risk of rickets.3 Rickets in women severely affects their subsequent 
reproductive success. It seems likely therefore that humans like so 
many other animals do respond in ways that are usually appropriate to 
the conditions in which they started life. These ways can be distinctly 
different from each other.
A series of studies that assessed people across their entire lifespan 
from birth to death has lent strength to the suggestion that human 
development involves environmental cues that prepare the individual 
for a particular sort of environment. Those people who had had the 
lowest body-weights at birth and at one year of age were most likely to 
die from cardiovascular disease later in life. They were also more likely 
to suffer from diseases such as diabetes and stroke in adulthood.4 How 
do these associations these connections make sense in adaptive terms? 
Could it be that, in bad conditions, the pregnant woman unwittingly 
signals to her unborn baby that the environment her child is about to 
enter is likely to be harsh? Such a weather forecast from the mother’s 
body could result in her baby being born with adaptations, such as 
a small body and a modified metabolism, that help it to cope with a 
shortage of food. If instead the baby finds itself growing up in an 
affluent industrialised society, it is poorly adapted.
Charles Darwin’s great theory of the evolution of adaptations found 
in nature remains as important as ever. Even so, the picture of the 
external hand of natural selection doing all the work is so compelling 
that it is easy to regard organisms as if they were entirely passive 
in the evolutionary process. Of course no biologist would deny that 
organisms, and animals especially, are active. Even so the notion of 
‘selection pressure’ does subtly downplay the role of organisms in the 
processes of change. When behavioural and developmental issues are 
joined together with questions about evolution, it becomes easier to 
perceive how an organism’s behaviour can initiate and direct lines of 
evolution. Developmental processes do not merely act as constraints, 
they can make certain types of evolutionary change more likely. The 
3  Chali, D., Enquselassie F. & Gesese M. (1998), A case-control study on determinants 
of rickets. Ethiop. Med. J. 36.4, 227–234
4  Bateson, P., Gluckman, P. & Hanson, M., The biology of developmental plasticity 
and the Predictive Adaptive Response hypothesis. J. Physiol. 592.11, 2357–2368, 
https://doi.org/10.1113/jphysiol.2014.271460
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explosion in the study of epigenetics (see Chapter 8) has suggested 
some ways in which a link between development and evolution might 
have occurred. 
Proposals about the active involvement of animals in evolution 
emphasise how their characteristics develop. By contrast, a certain style 
of evolutionary theory has placed all the emphasis on changes in gene 
frequencies in the course of evolution, thereby removing the organism 
from consideration. The justification for this type of theory has been that 
genes generally survive generation after generation, whereas individual 
organisms never do. The consequence of such an approach is that, when 
the effect of a gene on an organism is considered, the gene alone is 
supposed to determine the outcome.
The advance of epigenetics has awakened interest in the links 
between development and evolution. The transmitted epigenetic 
markers across generations could have facilitated genomic change. In 
most experimental studies, the environmental stimulus producing an 
epigenetic change is only applied in one generation. Experimentally this 
may be enough, since research on yeast suggests that an environmental 
challenge can permanently alter the regulation of genes.5 In natural 
conditions, the environmental cues that induce epigenetic change may 
be recurrent and repeat what has happened in previous generations. 
This recurring effect might have stabilised the developed characteristics 
until genomic reorganisation had occurred. The induced epigenetic 
changes that mediate adaptive plasticity might then have biased the 
sites of subsequent mutation. Variation at these sites may throw up 
developed characteristics, some of which are adaptive and subject 
to Darwinian evolution. This is one way in which plasticity leads to 
evolutionary change.
Behaviour and evolution
An animal’s behaviour is likely to have affected the course of evolution 
of its descendants in at least four ways. First, animals make active 
5  Braun, E. & David, L. (2011), The role of cellular plasticity in the evolution 
of regulatory novelty. In: Gissis, S.B. & Jablonka, E. (eds.), Transformations of 
Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 
181–191.
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choices, and the consequences of their choices are often important. 
Second, animals change the conditions in which they live by altering the 
physical or the social environment. Third, active animals often expose 
themselves to new conditions that reveal variability, with some variants 
more likely to survive than others. Finally, organisms are adaptable and 
are able to modify their behaviour in response to novel conditions and 
thereby make further genetic change possible.6 
The role of choice in evolution was clearly recognised by Darwin 
in his principle of sexual selection. He suggested that members of one 
sex choose to mate with individuals possessing a prominent feature. 
One example, the tail of the male peacock, has already been mentioned. 
Other examples are given in Chapter 9. Mate choice sets up a feedback 
process so that the act of choice affects the evolution of a characteristic 
in the chosen individual which subsequently then affects what is chosen 
in descendants. The postulated process could lead to an evolutionary 
instability with a runaway character.
The crucial agents necessary for this evolutionary process of 
adaptation driven by choice will generally be elements of the genome, 
but this is not always the case. In the past the fly Rhagoletis pomonella 
typically laid its eggs on the fruits of hawthorns.7 Around one hundred 
and fifty years ago some flies laid their eggs on apples. Their offspring 
preferred to lay their eggs on apples and the fly has since become a 
serious pest in USA orchards. The offspring retain through pupation 
a ‘memory’ of what they have eaten, and when the new generation of 
adult flies have mated they lay eggs on the particular species of plant 
they had eaten before metamorphosis. In this case the variation lies in 
the behaviour of the adult female flies choosing apples on which to lay 
their eggs, and onward transmission to the next generation is achieved 
by an imprinting-like mechanism. 
Darwinian evolution operates on characteristics that have developed 
within a particular set of conditions, many of which are environmental. 
Apparent design is produced, even when it is at the end of the long and 
6  The importance of the active role of behaviour in evolution is discussed in Bateson, 
P. (2013), New thinking about biological evolution. Biol. J. Linn. Soc. 112.2, 268–275, 
https://doi.org/10.1111/bij.12125
7  Michel, A.P. (2010), Widespread genomic divergence during sympatric speciation. 
PNAS 107.21, 9724–9729, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1000939107
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complicated process of development involving many different factors. 
The environment does not cease to be important for evolution just 
because it remains constant. Change the environment and the outcome 
of an individual’s development may be different. If an individual does 
not inherit its parents’ environment along with their genes and other 
transmittable factors, it may not be well adapted to the conditions in 
which it now finds itself. But the altered environmental conditions may 
throw up variation that was previously hidden, and from that may 
spring new lines of evolution.
Changes in environmental conditions might, for instance, be 
imposed by a catastrophe resulting from Earth’s collision with a comet 
or asteroid, or by climate change produced by glaciation and the impact 
of human activities on the planet. Less dramatically, a change in the 
environment of a given animal might be brought about because it can 
move, or in the case of many plants, because their seeds are dispersed. 
Although the migration of animals can be highly adaptive, the possibility 
of movement into a novel environment raises a key conceptual point in 
understanding how developmental plasticity and behaviour can drive 
evolutionary change. 
The organism’s contribution towards creating an environment to 
which it is best suited (see Chapter 9) should give pause if evolution is 
considered purely in terms of selection by external forces. By leaving an 
impact on their physical and social environment, organisms may affect 
the evolution of their own descendants, quite apart from changing 
the conditions in which they live themselves. Some of the impact is 
subtle, such as when a plant sheds its leaves which fall to the ground 
and changes the characteristics of the soil in which its own roots and 
those of its descendants grow. Some of the impact is conspicuous such 
as when beavers dam a river, flood a valley and create a private lake 
for themselves. It has been suggested that the aquatic environment 
created by the beavers led them to evolve adaptations such as webbed 
feet that facilitated swimming. The hypothesis is plausible because none 
of the beaver’s nearest relatives, the true gophers and kangaroo rats, 
have webbed feet. These ideas about the impact organisms on their 
environment have been developed extensively.
The effect of behavioural control on evolutionary change could be 
especially great when the social environment is a major component of 
the challenges faced by animals. The result would be that individuals 
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evolve to understand and predict what other members of their social 
group are about to do. They become better able to compete with others 
that do not have this ability. If individuals compete with each other 
within a social group and the result of 
the competition depends in part on each 
individual’s capacity to predict what the 
other will do, the evolutionary outcome 
might easily acquire a run-away 
property with the intellectually most 
advanced individuals driving others in 
the course of evolution to behave in the 
same way. Such an explanation, which 
has been developed eloquently by 
Nick Humphrey, would fit in with the 
increase in cranial capacity of humans, 
assuming that cranial capacity and 
intellectual ability are correlated.8
8 Humphrey, N. (1986), The Inner Eye. London: Faber & Faber.
Active control and manipulation 
of the environment occurs in play. 
Extended parental care found in birds 
and mammals may have provided the lift-off for the evolution of 
increasingly elaborate play with different beneficial outcomes. The 
surplus energy available to the young might have created optimal 
conditions for the evolution of the initial appearance of play behaviour. 
As discussed in Chapter 9 active engagement with the environment has 
great benefits, because the world is examined from different angles. 
Such engagement helps to construct a working knowledge of the 
environment: recognition of objects, understanding what leads to what, 
discovering that things are found when stones are turned over and the 
world is rearranged, learning what can and cannot be done with others. 
All these discoveries are real benefits for the individual, enhancing 
neural processing, physical fitness, behavioural coordination, and 
behavioural flexibility. 
Those individuals that play more have a putative advantage over 
the others. In effect they go through a period of training that perfects 
Nick Humphrey. Photo by LittleHow 
(2010), Wikipedia, https://commons.
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Nick_
Humphrey.jpg, CC BY-SA 3.0.
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the behaviour they will need when adult. Those of the non-playful 
individuals’ offspring that behave like the playful individuals are more 
likely to survive and, by degrees, the whole population plays more except 
when play has over-riding costs. If some individuals are able to profit 
in ways other than merely improving their motor skills during play, the 
evolutionary movement towards greater complexity will continue. The 
more playful individuals might, for example, become more aware of 
environmental contingencies than others and gain advantage by doing 
so. Once again this drives the evolution of the same abilities in the rest 
of the population. 
The next step in evolution could, among other things, have led to the 
ability to generate novel behaviour that would have provided the basis 
for creativity and innovation. Creative people perceive new relations 
between thoughts, or things, or forms of expression. They are able to 
combine them into new forms, connecting the seemingly unconnected. 
Where does such an evolutionary process stop? Presumably the costs 
of evolving new forms of behaviour or the sheer difficulties of doing so 
become limiting.
The effects of a new set of conditions lead either to immediate death 
or to an appropriate response to the challenge. Initially the response is 
not inherited, and differential survival of different genotypes may arise 
from subsequent differences in the ease with which the new character 
is expressed spontaneously. An unstable evolutionary process could be 
generated by spontaneous alterations in the genome, but the likelihood 
of this happening diminishes with the number of components in a 
response necessary to produce an overall change. The adaptability of 
the individuals allows by contrast the evolutionary process to occur 
piecemeal. 
Adaptability driving evolution could start operating when a group 
of organisms respond appropriately to a change in environmental 
conditions. The modification of form or behaviour occurs generation 
after generation under the changed conditions, but the modification 
will not be inherited. Any genetic variation in the ease of expression 
of the modified characteristic is liable to favour those individuals that 
express it most readily and with least cost. Consequently, an inherited 
predisposition to express the modification will tend to evolve. The 
longer the evolutionary process continues, the more frequent will be 
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such a predisposition. The process starts through learning or some other 
form of plastic modification within individuals, but this paves the way 
for a longer-term change in the genome. 
In principle, then, behaviour patterns that were initially acquired 
through the animal’s adaptability could be expressed spontaneously, 
without employing such plasticity, in subsequent generations. It might 
be argued that spontaneously expressing a behaviour pattern that had 
been learned in previous generations could be costly if it means that 
the animal loses its ability to learn. The argument is not cogent when 
applied to big-brained animals like birds and mammals with multiple 
parallel pathways for learning. In these animals, the loss of capacity to 
learn in one way has no effect on the capacity to learn in other ways. 
Adaptability can accelerate the rate at which challenges set by the 
environment can be met. The effect of plasticity on evolution may 
have become increasingly powerful as animals, in particular, became 
more complex. Elements could be recombined in different ways to 
perform different functions. This evolutionary process could lead to 
the establishment of increasingly elaborate organization and patterns 
of behaviour. When such complexity entails a greater ability to 
discriminate between different features of the environment or a greater 
ability to manipulate the environment, the organism will benefit and 
become more likely to survive and reproduce in the face of multiple 
challenges during its lifetime. A new adaptation would emerge in 
evolution when the accumulated effects of genomic reorganization 
altered the organism’s characteristics. Although these effects are specific 
to the new function, existing parts of the body’s characteristics could 
also be recruited for this function. Plasticity would promote much more 
rapid genetic evolution of complex sets of adaptive systems than could 
be accomplished by changes in the genome. This occurs as previously 
plastic elements are replaced by inherited elements and the evolving 
organism is able to replace through its plasticity missing elements 
in subsequent systems. The exposure to novel environments would 
be likely to lead to the subsequent evolution by means of classical 
Darwinian processes of morphological, physiological and biochemical 
adaptations to those niches.
One case of what can happen when an animal is adaptable has been 
provided by the three-spine stickleback after moving from a marine 
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to a freshwater environment and then occupying the deep water of 
lakes or shallow fresh water.9 It was able to adapt and then developed 
characteristics that distinguished it from its marine ancestors and which 
were specialized for the environment into which had moved. Shallow 
water males have striking red bellies involved in courtship whereas 
those in deep water, which is dark, do not.
Adaptability to new conditions may be physiological, such as 
coping with high altitudes by enhancing the oxygen carrying capacity 
of the blood. Humans living at low altitudes can usually cope when 
mountaineering, but over many generations this adaptability was 
followed by inherited genomic change which may take different forms. 
In the course of evolution people living in the Andes have developed a 
different response from those living in the Himalayas.10 
An important empirical demonstration of adaptability driving 
evolutionary change is that of the house finch. This species is endemic 
in the western parts of the USA. Some individuals were collected and 
taken east to New York but were quickly released when the collector 
realized that he might be prosecuted. The birds adapted and spread 
north to Canada.
9  Foster, S.A. et al. (2015), Evolutionary influences of plastic behavioral responses 
upon environmental challenges in an adaptive radiation. Integr. Comp. Biol. 55.3, 
406–417, https://doi.org/10.1093/icb/icv083 
10  Beall, C.M. (2007), Two routes to functional adaptation: Tibetan and Andean high-
altitude natives. PNAS 104.1, 8655–8660, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0701985104
The same species has spontaneously moved north into Montana 
where it has been intensively studied. After a period involving a 
great deal of plasticity in a new 
environment, the house finch popu-
lations spontaneously expressed the 
physiological characteristics that 
best fitted them to their new habitats 
without the need for developmental 
plasticity. Initially the adaptive onset 
of the time of incubation that occurred 
in colder climates was affected by the 
new ambient temperature, but as 
evolution occurred in the population, 
these behavioural and physiological 
The adaptable house finch. Photo by 
Thomas Quine (2007), Wikipedia, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Male_House_Finch_profile_
(23910087075).jpg. CC BY 2.0.
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effects were no longer dependent on external cues for their expression. 
After using their adaptability to respond to the new environmental 
conditions, the house finch populations spontaneously expressed the 
characteristics that best fitted them to their new habitats.11
Conclusions
Adaptability probably appeared at an early stage in biological 
evolution. Its role in promoting evolutionary change has not been much 
investigated. Even so it is plausible that, like the other ways in which an 
organism’s activities can affect its descendants, adaptability has been 
important. Adaptability can accelerate the rate at which challenges set 
by the environment can be met. The effect of plasticity on evolution may 
have become increasingly powerful as animals, in particular, became 
more complex. Elements could be recombined in different ways to 
perform different functions. This evolutionary process could lead to 
the establishment of increasingly elaborate organization and patterns 
of behaviour. 
Darwin’s famous metaphor of natural selection is deeply embedded 
in the modern language of biologists. Natural selection is treated as an 
agent in much the same way as humans are agents in artificial selection. 
The strictures on the misuse of the selection metaphor in evolutionary 
biology will not change many minds since it is not easy to give up the 
habits of a lifetime. Hopefully, though, the more adventurous will 
try replacing ‘selection’ in their writing with ‘Darwinian evolution’. 
This would gives honour where it is due and encourage the view that 
behaviour does play an active role in evolution.
With the growing acceptance that organisms are not passive in 
relation to their role in the evolution of their descendants, focus on the 
adaptability driver helps to bring together studies of development with 
those of evolution, a principal aim of this book. By doing so, the systems 
approach provides satisfying explanations for the appearance of design 
in so much behaviour.
11  Badyaev, A.V. (2009), Evolutionary significance of phenotypic accommodation in 




Two themes have run through this book about the development and 
evolution of behaviour. The first has been about the adaptive processes 
that give rise to the appearance of design in nature. The second has been 
about systems, the active role of the organism and the different factors 
that influence development and evolution. These themes are relevant to 
human development and some chapters are almost exclusively devoted 
to human examples.
Not all behaviour is adaptive in the present. In humans the dietary 
preferences that were adaptive in the past, such as those for salt and sugar, 
can seriously disrupt health when these substances are readily available.1 
Gambling, which sometimes ruins lives, can seem irrational but makes 
sense in a world in which the delivery of rewards is rarely random. If 
you have done something that produced a win, it is usually beneficial 
to repeat what you did — except when you get into a casino. Similarly, 
the tendency of parents to protect their children from all contact with 
unknown people after hearing from the media of a child murder would 
have been beneficial in a small community where such news might 
represent real danger. In the modern context, such risk-averse behaviour 
in a society in which the incidence of child murder has remained constant 
for decades merely impoverishes the child’s development. Even though 
1  Narvaez, D., Valentino, K., Fuentes, A., McKenna, J. & Gray, P. (2014), Ancestral 
Landscapes in Human Evolution: Culture, Childrearing and Social Wellbeing. New York: 
Oxford University Press.
© 2017 Patrick Bateson, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0097.11
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they were once adaptive, the emotional responses of parents can now 
have adverse effects on their children’s lives.2 
The appearance of design can generate misconceptions. Even so, 
when a process like behavioural imprinting is examined, it is reasonable 
to suppose that it plays an important role in the development and 
survival of each individual bird. Understanding the rules that underlie 
the development of the individual and the reciprocity between those 
rules and the individual’s experience is important in making sense of 
the complexity of development.
The young organism has to deal with many challenges that meet it as 
it develops. Its ecology may be very different from that of the adult, in 
which case it may have special adaptations to deal with those conditions. 
Like a caterpillar metamorphosing into a butterfly, a human child has 
adaptations to deal with each stage of its life cycle. The prevalence of 
play in the young is an example.
Despite the changes in the individual’s repertoire of behaviour 
as it grows up, early experience can have long lasting effects on its 
preferences and habits when it finally matures. These aspects of its 
behaviour are often stable, but in stressful conditions they may change 
when the stress is accompanied by new forms of experience. The change 
can be adaptive since it can enable the individual to cope with a world 
that may be very different from the one in which it grew up. 
In mammals, parent and offspring are often thought to be in 
conflict. On this view, the communication between them takes the 
form of mutual manipulation. The offspring seeks to gain maximum 
advantage from its parent and the parent seeks to defend its long-term 
reproductive interests. Against this view, communication is often such 
that both the sender and receiver of a signal or cue may benefit by both 
parties treating it as useful to themselves. In the case of parent-offspring 
2 The origins of violence in human society involve many inherited dispositions 
or adverse experiences in early life. The consequences of these developmental 
abnormalities are expressed as harmful or psychopathic behaviour already, before 
the age of three, and may persist throughout life. However, in a humane society 
much can be done to help such troubled people by identifying them early on, 
giving their parents extra support, treating them with sensitivity and not punishing 
them for bad behaviour. They need not be treated as irredeemable and effectively 
given a life sentence. An excellent discussion of the origins of anti-social violence is 
given by Adrian Raine (2014), The Anatomy of Violence: The Biological Roots of Crime. 
London: Penguin Books.
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relations, parents do well to take into account the condition of their 
offspring and the offspring must likewise pay attention to the condition 
of their parent. In other words, their behaviour is adaptive for both 
parties.
Many animals choose their mates carefully. This is especially true 
in birds and many mammals. Inbreeding has costs but so too does 
excessive outbreeding. The way in which an optimal balance is achieved 
is in part through experience with close kin in early life leading to a 
preference for a mate who is a bit different but not too different from 
familiar kin. An important issue is whether the avoidance of incest found 
in most human societies serves the same function as the avoidance of 
inbreeding. A common function is questionable and the taboos or more 
likely to be an expression of conformism directed at individuals doing 
what most people would not do.
With the great successes of molecular biology, attention has been 
focused on the role of genes in development. Genes are unquestionably 
needed for the inheritance of much behaviour. The importance of 
genes, however they are defined, does not mean that a simple link can 
be found between genes and behaviour. The links are usually complex 
and metaphors such as genes providing a blueprint for behaviour are 
misleading. The benefits of the selfish gene approach in understanding 
the complexities of evolution do not imply that genes program the 
development of an individual. Understanding development requires a 
systems approach that takes into account all the genes and environmental 
inputs that are effective.
Development and evolution are usually regarded as separate 
domains of inquiry. Even so an organism’s adaptability provides a useful 
link between these domains. It offers understanding of the relationship 
between what an individual does and how its activities might influence 
the genomes of its descendants. Many theoretical arguments have been 
used to explain how this might happen and some empirical evidence 
supporting these arguments is becoming available.
The notion of genetic determination, which is so firmly embedded 
in evolutionary theory, has seriously interfered with attempts to 
understand the dynamics of behavioural development and its role in 
evolution. If anything has been learned in recent years, it is that what 
an individual animal does in its life is conditional and depends on the 
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reciprocal character of the transactions with the world about it. This 
knowledge also points to ways in which an animal’s own behaviour can 
provide the variation that influences the subsequent course of evolution. 
When developmental issues are joined with questions about evolution, 
it becomes easier to perceive how an organism’s behaviour can initiate 
and shape evolutionary change. 
These changes in biological thinking affect the relations between the 
natural and the social sciences. The biggest block to bringing the biological 
and social sciences together was the presumption that Darwinian 
evolution implied genetic determinism.  This block has now been removed 
by advances in biological thought (see Chapter 8). Behavioural biologists 
have sometimes misleadingly applied terms such as ‘greed’, ‘spiteful’, 
‘rape’, ‘marriage’ and ‘incest’ to animals. This may have been done to 
lighten the normally dull language of scientific discourse. However, these 
terms have an established usage in describing human emotions, and in 
describing human institutions with all their associated rights, individual 
responsibilities and culturally transmitted rules on what people may and 
may not do. Problems of communication between disciplines have been 
compounded when, having found some descriptive similarities between 
animals and humans, and having investigated the animal cases, biologists 
or their popularisers have used the animal findings to ‘explain’ human 
behaviour. Such arguments rely on a succession of slippages in meaning 
and are usually unconscious, but they provoke hostility in those people 
in the social sciences and humanities who feel threatened by an apparent 
take-over bid on the part of biologists. An example of how the effects of 
early experience promoted by biologists have been misconstrued by the 
social scientists is described in Chapter 5.
The conflicts of motivation evident in studies of animal behaviour 
bear on important issues to do with human behaviour. In many social 
contexts a person might weigh up consciously or unconsciously the 
benefits to themselves of behaving in a particular way. The benefits 
might include avoiding disapproval or punishment by other people. 
However, all these dispositions can conflict with powerful impulses 
to act in ways that benefit the social group, the tribe, or some larger 
assemblage without any direct benefits to the individual. They may 
cooperate with individuals they regard as belonging to their own social 
group and express fear or hate of those individuals they regard as 
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being different or foreign. They may be influenced by their desire for 
leadership and strongly disapprove of anybody who does not conform 
with their views. None of these impulses are invariant. They can be, and 
often are, changed by experience. Conformism and the expression of 
fear and hate can be inhibited, or modified either by social norms or by 
becoming aware of the damaging consequences of allowing full reign to 
such impulses. 
By bringing together evidence from different areas of knowledge, 
more powerful theoretical perspectives can be formulated. Their impact 
is not only on scientific approaches to the systems of development 
and evolution, but also on how humans change institutional rules 
that have become dysfunctional or design public health measures 
when mismatches occur between themselves and their environments. 
It affects how humans think about themselves and their own capacity 
for change. The biological approach to human psychology does not 
imply that individuals do not have free choices. Through their decisions 
individuals clearly do make a big difference to what happens in their 
lives. They may be sometimes surprised by the consequences of their 
own actions. Even so, they are able to anticipate the consequences of 
various courses of action and choose between them on the basis of 
their likely costs and benefits. Planning before doing is clearly of great 
advantage. The evidence stares us in the face. People do make well-
considered decisions and they benefit from doing so.
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own capacity for change.
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